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PREFACE 
This study is concerned primarily with the Nazi occupation of 
Northern Yugoslavia during 1941 and 1942. Hitler's plan for converting 
Slovenia into a germanized frontier zone of the Third Reich is assessed 
in the light of Slovene history, most particularly since 1918. The 
evidence for the Nazi resettlement program designed to achieve Hitler's 
goal came from manuscript documents, which were written largely by the 
SS officers in charge of population manipulation. 
I wish to express appreciation to members of my advisory committee 
t 
from the Department of History at Oklahoma State University who gave 
helpful criticism in the preparation of the text. Professor Douglas 
Hale served as committee chairman and offered valuable advice concern-
ing the study from its inception to its conclusion. Professor George 
Jewsbury imparted to its development his own keen understanding of 
Eastern Europe. To Professors John Sylvester and Charles Dollar, who 
read the study in its final form, I am also indebted. 
In addition, I wish to thank my father, Dr. E. A. V. Horiak, for 
his insightful comments. Dr. Joseph Suhadolc of the Department of For-
eign Languages at Northern Illinois University gave freely of his time 
in reviewing the text. For his kindness, I am most grateful, because 
he was in a position to evaluate critically much of what here is re-
corded. 
My appreciation is also extended to the staff of the Oklahoma 
State University Library for aid in the procurement of source material. 
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Slovenia has been characterized by A. E. Moodie, one of its chief . 
geographers, as "a zone of strain." Spilling over froi;n the northernmost 
reaches of the Balkan Peninsula into Central Europe, it is bounded 
v 
roughly by the .Soca (Isonzo), Drava (Drau, Drave) and Kupa .rivers. This 
land is located at th~ juncture of the two greatest geological regions 
of Europe--the Alpine and Dinar.ic ranges. Here run passes of incalcul-
able strategic value leading between the heart of the continent and the 
Adria tic Sea. Indeed, the. Slovene domain has served as the crossroads 
of !:he Danubian and Mediterranean powers since ancient times. 1 
The Sloyenes thei;nselves bear the imprint of their residence in "a 
zone of strain." A branch of the South Slavs, they came into possession 
of their land in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. Experiencing only 
a short and problematic independent political history in the early 
Middle Ages, they succumbed to German domination for fully a thousand 
years. By the fourteenth century, the greatest part of Slovenia had 
fallen to the Habsburg power. 
Situated at ·the bord,ers .of the Slavic and Germanic worlds, these 
mountain peasants and herdsmen were torn between the two cultures. They 
maintained their language; a linguistically distinct branch of South 
1A. E. Moodie, "Slovenia--A Zone of Strain," Journal of Central 
European Affairs, Vol. III (1943), pp. 66-68. 
1 
2 
Slavic, but were profoundly influenced by German thought. Many of them 
were assi:milated into 11Germandom11• throughout the centuries. In .recent· 
times, when .nationalism became a dominant :force in Europe, the Slovenes 
defied clear-cut classification. Were they Germans .because of their 
integral and. age-old association with Ge.rman history, or were they 
Slavs .because .of their ethnic heritage?. 
When Hitler created the Third Reich for his master race; he decided 
to include a portio~ of Slovenia within its confines. He deemed that 
the German·impact .upon.at least some of the Slovenes had not been sig-
nificantly erased by their brief inclusion in Yugoslavia between the 
two world wars. Certain of these particular South Slavs were eligible 
for the supreme honor of becoming Germans, he .believed. Slovenes who. 
could not qualify for germanization were t~ be deported and replaced by 
Germanic people. After the invasion of Yugoslavia in April, 1941, 
Hitler ordered one of his lieutenants in Slovenia to "make this land 
2 German again for me." When the .reconstruction work was complete, the 
Slovenian outpost of the Third Reich was to form a living wall against 
the encroachments of the racially unsuitable hordes on.the southeastern 
frontier. 
The implementation of the Nazi dream for Slovenia failed and not, 
simply because of the exigencies of the military situation after the 
defeat at Stalingrad .in early 1943. The Nazis justified their terri-
torial expansion into Slovenia on the .basis of the age-old Slovene 
211Machen Sie mir dieses Land wieder Deutsch." Quoted .in Tone· 
Ferenc, "Le Syst~med'.Occupation des Nazis en Slov~nie," in Petar 
Brajovich, Jovan Marjanovich and Franjo Tudman, eds., ~ Syst~mes 
d'Occupation ~ Yougoslavie, 1941-1945 (Belgrade: L'Institut·pour 
l'!tude du Mouvement Ouvrier, 1963), pp. 50, 121-122. 
3 
attachment; to the Habsb.urg Monarchy, which they considered a predeces- . 
sor of the .Third Reich. The Nazis chose.to ignore the nature of that 
attac~ent, however. Wh~le the Habsburgs had ruled their domain with 
the assumption of German s~premacy, they were not Pan-German. However 
begrudgingly, they tolerateq. national self-expression among their sub-
ject peoples, Rule by the _Austrian .German·Habsburgs was, therefore, 
a substantially different matte.r from rule by Hitler. The Slovenes 
supported the concept of loyalty to.the Emperor (Kaisertreue) as 
Slovenes;. not . as Germans. The supposed Nazi inheritance. of Slovene 
lands was thus consummated under false pretenses. 
The ~azis.failed because they arrogantly underestimated the 
strength:of Slo:vene nationalism, since the right.of national self-
expression for non-German societies _would have contradicte.d the basic· 
premise of the Third Reich. The. evidence permits one to contend, that 
the .vast majority of Slovenes co~ld not.have been transformed into 
Germans at the behest of the Ftihrer. 
This study-deals with Hitler's attempt.to convert trad,itionally 
Slovene territory into an.ethnically homogeneous extension of.Greater 
Germany. The situation of Slovenia within prewar Yugoslavia and Nazi 
diplomacy prior to o~cupation will be explored as background. An im-
portant source for the .investigation of the grandiose program of germ-
anization was the.chapter "The System of the _Nazi Occupation in 
Slovenia,"·contributed by Tone Ferenc to the -official Yugoslav report, 
on the systems .of occupation in. Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, presented to the 
Third International Cc;mgress on the History of the European Resistance, 
held at Carlsbad in 1963. 3 Ferenc' s account was. the first attempt to 
3 Ibid., pp. 47-133. 
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present the whole picture of the Nazi occupation in Slovenia. 
The Yugoslav archives upon which Ferenc's work is based are incom-
plete and inferior to those found in other countries. 4 Certain lacunae 
have been filled by a perusal of German records pertaining to World War 
II microfilmed at Alexandria, Virginia, under the direction of the 
United States National Archives and the American Historical Association. 
Five rolls of microfilm, covering records of the German Foreign Insti-
tute or DAI (Deutsches Ausland-Institut) in Stuttgart, were utilized 
5 for this study. The files of the .DAI are of particular interest, be-
cause that agency was responsible for the documentation of all Nazi re-
settlement activities. Information on the phase of the Nazi occupation 
of Slovenia dealing with .germanization was thus attained to supplement 
Ferenc's pioneering endeavor. Also extremely valuable to this study 
were the Documents on German Policy, 1918-1945, published jointly by 
6 the United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office. 
It is hoped that this work will provide some basis for further 
investigation. 
4Ibid., p. 121. 
5united States National Archives, Guides to German Records Micro-
filmed at Alexandria, Virginia (46 vol., Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1958-1965). Vol. 16:· Records of the Deutsches Ausland 
Institute, Stuttgart, Part.!_: Records on Re's°ettlement (1960). 
6united States Department of 0 State, Documents_£!!. German Foreign 
Policy, 1918-1945 (18 vols. to date, Washington: Government Printing 
Office , 1949- ) . Hereafter each volume of the Documents on German 
Foreign Pol i cy, 1918-.!2!!1, wi ll be designated DGFP fo llowed by the 
series letter and volume number. 
CHAPTER II 
SLOVENIA BETWEEN THE WARS 
A necessary context for the Nazi rule in Slovenia from 1941 to 
\ 1945 can be gained by examining the Slovene experience in Yugoslavia . 
from 1918 to 1941. The Slovenes benefited from their political assoc-:-
iation with the Serbs and Croats after the creation of Yugoslavia in 
late 1918, but they were not altogether happy in the new South Slav 
state between World War I.and Il. Although they were at last the rulers 
in their own lands; and their shrewd and opportunistic leader, Monsignor 
Anton Koroshets (Koro~ec), had won for them a position of power out of 
proportion to their numbers, they chafed under the hegemony of the 
Serbs in Belgrade as a result of a.number of geographical, ethnological, 
economic; and political factors. 
Slovenia exist.ed only as a concept, not as a pol:i,tical reality 
prior to 1918. The Slovenes were never unified under.the Habsburgs. 
They dwelt in separate Austrian crownlands: Styria (Steiermark, 
v 
Stajerska, Styrie), Carniola (Krain, Kranjsko, Carniole) and Carinthia 
(Karnten, Korotka, Carinthie). They were settled in the Julian March 
(Julijska Karjina), located at the headwaters of the Adriatic Sea near 
the Italian border. Slovene.communities in this region were divided 
between the.provinces of G3rz and Gradiska (Gorizia, Gorica and 
v Gradiska) and !stria (Istra). · Furthermore, Slovenes in Prekmurje 
~ , (Ubermurgebiet, Muravidek, Outre-Mura) had for centuries been part of 
5 
6 
the historic Hungarian crown of St. Stephen. (See Map I.) 
Although the Slovenes were among the last peoples of the Habsburg 
Empire to abandon hope for its reconstruction after World War I, they 
voluntarily entered into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 
1918. As late as May, 1917, their leaders had pleaded in Vienna for a 
trialistic solution to the problems of the monarchy. As devout Roman 
Catholics, the Slovenes wished to join the Roman Catholic Croats in the 
formation of an autonomous South Slav unit within the Empire. They 
largely ignored the Yugoslav movement fostered by the Greek Orthodox 
Serbs until the last months of the war, when it became obvious that 
South Slav demands would not be heeded and that the monarchy itself was 
soon to collapse. On October 29, 1918, the Slovenes under the leader-
ship of Koroshets seceded from the Habsburg Empire. In December, they 
were formally received by their new ruling house, the Serbian Karageorge-
vich dynasty. Hard political reality dictated hasty action, since 
Kaisertreue had become irrelevant. 
With the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, rrore 
Slovenes lived together in a single body politic than had done so for a 
millennium. Even so, they were a minority within the new kingdom. The 
Slovenes numbered a little over one million, compared to six million 
Serbs and between three and four million Croats. Their unification, 
moreover, was not complete. When the boundaries of Slovenia were 
finally settled, about a half million Slovenes were left in adjacent 
areas in Italy and Austria. (See Map II.) 
By the Treaty of St. Germain cif September 10, 1919, Slovenian pos-
session of lands from the Cisleithanian half of the Habsburg.Empire was 
formally acknowledged. Most of Carniola, the heart of Slovene settle-
ment, with its capital city of Ljubljana (Laibach), was ceded by 
7 
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Austria, as were Lower Styria (Untersteiermark, Spodnja ~tajerska, 
Basse-Styrie) and three small districts in the southeastern corner of 
Carinthia: the Me'fa Valley (Miesstal), the Commune of Jezersko 
(Seeland) and the area around Dravograd (Unterdrauburg), Provision 
was made in the treaty for a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt (Celovec)-
Villach (Beljak) basin of southern Carinthia to determine whether the 
population wished to remain with Austria or to join the new Yugoslav 
state, The .residents there voted on October 10, 1920, to .be Austrian 
rather than Yugoslav subjects. 
9 
Because the cessions to Yugoslavia were hotly contested by the 
Austrians and were fundamenial to Hitler's revisionist aims .in south-
eastern Europe, it is illuminating to study the.results of the 1910 
census, the last taken in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The imperial 
censuses.determined nationality o~ the principle of the language habitu-
ally spoken (Umgangssprache). A nationality count on this basis always 
under cuts a minority and favors the dominant people. Under conditions 
obtaining in the Monarchy, Slovenes were forced to speak German in daily 
intercourse. The German language, particularly in the schools, was 
pushed at the expense of Slovene by .the Habsburg administration. 
Although the 1910 population figures weighted nationality toward 
the German, the Slovenes showed remarkable strength. In Carniola, 
520,000 Slovenes (94% of the population) and 28,000 Germans were count-
ed. In Lower Styria, 411,000 South Slavs (84% of the population) and 
76,000 Germans were enumerated. The designation "South Slav" is used 
here, because a few thousand Croats were settled among the Slovenes in 
Lower Styria. In the area of Carinthia where the plebiscite was con-
ducted, 49,400 Slovenes (67% of the population) and 24,900 Germans were 
10 
reported. The Carinthian regions incorporated outright into Yugoslavia 
were more homogenous, however, with 11,900 Slovenes (79% of the popula-
1 tion) and 3,200 Germans, Even by the most conservative estimates, 
therefore, Slovene acquisitions from the Cisleithanian half of the 
Habsburg Empire were justified on ethnic grounds. 
By th~ Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920, Hungary ceded Prekmurje, 
which was included in Slovenia. This small district, extending north 
of the Mura (Mur) river, was occupied almost exclusively by 120,000 
descendants of the old Pannonian Slovenes. 2 A Magyar minority of 
25,000 had previously formed the ruling class as owners of large es.;.. 
tates. Budapest claimed Prekmurje during the interwar years solely on 
h . . .. 1 3 an 1stor1c pr1nc1p e. 
The Slovenes lost out completely to the Italians in a struggle 
over the Julian March. Rome's territorial demands there were motivated 
largely by strategic considerations. The province of G~rz and Gradiska 
was awarded to Italy by the Treaty of St. Germain. In 1910 it had a 
population which was 62% Slovene. The Italians were permitted to ex-
tend the eastern limits of the area, which they renamed Venezia Giula, 
to the crest of the Julian Alps. Consequently, Rome was granted a 
strip of western Carniola. The Italians pressed claims for Istria, 
where the population was·reported as 58% Slovene-Croatian in 1910. In 
the Treaty of Rapallo 6f November 12, 1920, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
1 . Robert Langer, The Austro-Yugoslav Problem (New York: Mimeo-
graphed report, 1951), p. 33. 
2Henry Baerlein, The Birth of Yugoslavia (2 vol., London: Leonard 
Parsons, 1922), VoL II:-p. 373. 
3Fran Zwitter~ "The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy," Austrian 
History Yearbook, Vol. III, Pt. 2 (1967), p. 160. 
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and Slovenes ceded Istria. The aspirations of approximately 400,000 to 
500,000 Slovene.s were subordinated to the wishes of the Italian nation 
at the peace tables. 
The Sl.ovene·lands were thus pieced together--or rent; asunder, de-
pending upon one'•s point of view,--by th.e various treaties after World 
War I. They were ,.governed by two separate organizational plans between 
the wars. From 1920 to 1929, Slovenia was divided into the Ljubljana 
and Maribor (~arburg) administ~atiye, distr.icts. 4 In 1929, the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats.and Slovenes was reorganized into the.Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia. Nine provinces (banovinas) were established, and the Slovene 
lands were united into the Province of Drava. (Dravska Banovina). In-
eluding 15,800 square kilometers out of the 247,500 in Yugoslavia as a 
. 5 
whole, Drava,was the smallest of the nine provinces. 
As a people~ the.Slovenes differed significantly from their South 
Slav compatriots. Their long subj.ugation to German domination :rendered 
their culture less. Slavic, and, at the same time, more westernized and. 
more advanced. The.German impact upon.the Slovenes can be measured by 
comparing their province to the other eight Yugoslav provinces. It was 
the only one with a hietory of German .rule. While Croatia had formed a 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it had been governed directly by 
Budapest, not·by Viem1a. In the.1930's, literacy above.the age of ten 
was 93% for Slovenia, while the average for Yugoslavia takert as.a whole 
55%. 6 was 
4 ~· Anthony J. Klancar, "Slovenia.and the Slovenes," Journal of 
Central European Affairs,. Vol. VI (Apr:Ll, 1946), p. 7. 
5nudley Kirk,. Europe~s Population iri the Interwar Years· (Geneva: 
League of·Natio~~' 1946); p. 275~ 
6I~id. 
12 
The system of landholding in Slovenia could also be traced directly 
to German influence. The Slovenes did not cling to the ancient zadruga 
7 
system, as did other branches of the South Slav peoples. They did not, 
consequently, organize into loose family cooperatives, by which farm-
lands were divided and subdivided until they became uneconomic dwarf 
plots. Instead, the Slovenes accepted the Germanic principle of primo-
geniture. Peasant farms remained of viable size. In 1931, the average 
farm in Slovenia was 8.27 hectares (roughly 20.5 acres). This exceeded 
the average acreage obtaining in any other Yugoslav province. 8 German 
influence was patently responsible for other advanced aspects of the 
Slovene economy. Cooperatives had been organized in the 1890's and 
were well established by the interwar period. Slovenia was industrial-
ized before any other part of Yugoslavia and had progressed farthest in. 
this direction. 9 In short, Slovenia exhibited characteristics more 
typical of Central Europe rather than those of a Balkan state. 
As a consequence of the indelible imprint made by the Germans, 
Slovene nationalism was weak. The nobility had been either German or 
germanized for centuries. The absence of a large and economically in-
dependent middle class.deterred the growth of national consciousness. 10 
The small number of bourgeoisie in the towns got ahead by becoming ger-
manized until the nineteenth century. Only within the peasantry, which 
7Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugo-
slavia (Stanford: . Stanford University Pres-;:-1955), p. 131. 
8Ibid. , p. 386. 
9Ibid.,. p. 171. 
lODinko Toma~if, "Nationality Problems and Partisan Yugoslavia," 
Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. VI (July, 1946), p. 124. 
13 
formed the greatest part of .the Slovene society, were carried the seeds 
of a national consciousness which resisted germanization and·insured 
the ultimate survival of the Slovenes as a national group. 11 Those 
seeds were slow in·. developing. The word ."Slovenian" had not even been 
12 introduced until the early nine~eenth century. · Previously, the 
Slovenes had been known as Wends (Winds, Windischers). The latter term 
came from the·old German word for Slavs13 and carried a certain conno-
i f . f . . 14 tat on o in er1oi;-1ty. 
What Slovene nationalism existed in the early .modern period was 
dissipated by provincial particularism. Loyalty to a state or province 
was more important to .Slovenes. than ._a consciousness of nationality based 
15 
upon ethnic factors. They saw themselves as Carinthians or Styrians· 
or Carniolans more than as members of a distinct South Slav group. 
This tendency explains in large measure the results of the 1920 plebis-
cite, in which Carinthian Slovenes voted to remain with Austria. At 
the Paris Peace Conference, t'he Austrians·requested in vain another 
plebiscite in the Maribor region of Lower Styria on the basis of strong 
Styrian sentiment there. While not disputing the absolute majority of 
the Slovenes in the Maribor environs, the pro-Austrian delegates claimed 
11Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and 
National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918 (2 volumes~ew 
York: 1950}, Vol. I, p. 294. 
12Thomas M. Barker, ~ Sloye·ries of Carinthia (Washington: League 
of CSA, 1958), p. 49. -
·· 
13Michae~ B .. Petrovich, ''The Rise of Modern Slovenian Historiogra.::. 
phy,'' Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XXII (January, 1963), p. 
446. . . · 
14 · · .· 
. Bark~r, ~ Slovenes of Carinthia, p. 173. 
15 . ' .. · 
Petrovich, "The Rise of Modern Slovenian Historiography," p. 441. 
14 
that many of these residents would prefer attachment to Austria rather 
than to Yugoslayia. 16 This lingering weakness of Slovene nationalism 
was to be exploited by German nc;ttio11-alists iQ. the 1930's. 
Despite a.late start compared with other.nationalities in the 
Habsburg Empire, the .Slovenes began to assert themselves during the 
Napoleonic period. The brie~ period of French rule hastened a national 
awakening wit~ Carniola and the University of Ljubljana at the core. 
In retaliation, German pressure increased in StyJ;:ia and Carinthia, and 
many Slovenes succumbed to assimilation in these two prov inc es. By the 
end of the .nineteenth century, the two major components of Slovenia ex-
hibited a significant difference as a result of the nationality strug- ·. 
gle. The urban population in Carniola .. became solidly Slovene, while in 
17 Lower. Styria, the bourgeoisie continued to speak German in the towns. 
The breakdown of the Austro-Hungaric;tn Monarchy found the Slovene lead-
ership determined to consolidate national strength within the 1919-1920 
boundaries df the country. 18 
The alteration in the position of the German minority after the 
establishment of Yugoslavia .. was ref lee ted . in popula Uon .s ta tis tics. 
The German .decline is illustrated by the. following figures for Slovene 
cities with the ,heaviest Germanconcentrations: 19 
16united States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, The Peace Conference, 1919 (13 volumes, 
Washington~ Government Printing Office, 1942-1947). Vol. VII, pp. 
953-954 
17zwitter,"The Sloven.es and the Habsburg Monarchy," pp. 171, 177. 
18 John,A. Arnez, Slovenia in European Affairs (New York: League 
of C SA , 19 5 8 ) , p • 2 9 • 
19 · Der Auslandsdeutsche, VoL XX. (1937), p. 764. 
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Ethnic German Population 
1910 1921 1931 
Maribor (Marburg) 22.,653 6,512 2,741 
Celje (Cilli) 4,6.25 848 449 
Ptuj (Pet tau) 3,672 969 559 
Although many Germans chose to emigrate from Slovenia, the actual popu-
lation losses between 1910 and 1921 were not as dramatic as pictured 
above. Many peoplewho had been counted as Germans ori the b{isis of 
Umgangssprache in the 1910 Habsburg census appeared on the 1921 and 
1931 census rolls as Slovenes, since official Yugoslav nationality fig-
ures were based on the criterion of mother tongue. The German popula-
tion loss was openly lamented in Der Auslandsdeutsche, a newsletter for 
persons of German origin living abroad, which was published by the 
G F. . I . 20 erman oreign nstitute. By the beginning of World War .rr; there 
were only 25,000 Germans reported in Slovenia. 
During the interwar period, most of these ethnic Germans lived in 
compact enclaves inside Slovenia. There was only one major German 
settlement in Carniola, the Ko~evje (Gottschee) district near the 
Croatian frontier. The rural population there comprised one of .the 
oldest German settlements abroad, having been founded fully six centur-
ies before. A few Germans still resided in Ljubljana, which liad been 
transformed throughout the nineteenth century from a German garrison. 
town into a Slovene city of 75,000. Other German communities, comprised 
mainly of substantial citizens in market towns, radiated from'the 
Austrian frontier throughout Lower Styria. The most important cities 
20 rbid. , 764 713 PP• , • 
with slI).all German:minorities-:-Ma;ibo'J:'., Celje and Ptuj--were.all in 
Lower Styria!. 
16 
Sin~e th¢. social strilqture of Slovenia has been outlined, it would 
be pertinent ta question how its. citizens fared ecQnomically in, the 
in.terwa.r yearei. Slovenia had· _72, 9 inhabitants . per square _kilometer in , 
1931. 21 This made it the-secand most.populous province in,Yugoslavia. 
Considerable progress had been.ma.de toward industrialization •. In-1931, 
22% of the Slovenes were engaged· in, industry,_ mining or handicrafts, 
. . 
while only_11% of the.entire Yugoslav population was SO OCCl,lpied in 
22 that year.· Much.of .the Slovene industry .was based on-the timber and 
coal·resources of its Aipi'Q.e ranges:to the North, but steel production 
. . 
was. also ·considerable, Yet;_ despite this ,trenq. toward a more, balanced 
economy,_Slovenia remained poor.and predominantly _agricultural in the 
1930's. There simplywa.s nbt eriough land, .fertile though it was between 
. . . 
the_Drava and Sava.rivers, ta·go,arourid~- Of _the 1,144,300inhabitants 
23 in Slovenia in 1931, approximately 60% were dependent upon agriculture. 
' . 
Eeitimates ,on the surplus agricultural population differ, but-it was de--
. . · . . .· 24 
cidedly more extensive,than.in-other Yugoslav provinces. i"hese 
21 
· s~ D. Zagoroff, J. Vegh; A. D. Bilimovich, The Agricultural 
Economy of the Danubian Countries, .193~ .... 1945 (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1955) ~ p. 29~. ·--:-- ----- -
22Tomasevic.h,- Peasants, Politics an:d Economic-Change. in Yugoslavia, 
p. 304. 
23 Ibid. 
24Wilbert K. Moore, Economic Demography of Ea.stern and South-. 
Eastern Europe (Geneva: League ·of Natic,,ri.s,· 1945),-p. 64; Tomasevich, 
Peasants; Politics and Economic'Change, p. 324. Moore gives the.surplus 
agric4lt:ural population for Slovepia as 65.9%, for allof Yugoslavia as 
61.5%. _Tomasevich presents th~ figures.of·58.5% for Slovenia and 44.4%-
for Yugoslavia a~ a-whole~ Tomasevich criticized-Moore's calculations 
be.cause he.felt ,that Moore did.not have enough data from Yugoslavia for 
his elaborate·statisiical procedure (p. ·313). 
17 
statistics become more significant when it is recalled that Yugoslavia 
it.self suffered from enormous problems of over-population. 
The great world depression aggravated .the already existing poverty. 
Th~ production of meat and.milk for marketing was an important feature 
of agricultural activity in Slovenia. Yet, in 1932, a Slovenian peasant 
25 
received only two cents a pound for a calf. The poverty of the ex-
tensive .landless.peasantry before World War I::C was particularly oppres-
sive. In Lower Styria, for example, the situation of seasonal workers, 
d 1 b d ·1 i h . d · bl 26 ay a orers, an to1. ers n t e v1.neyar s was m1.sera e. 
In the late 1930's, the Yugoslav economy became increasingly de-
pendent.upon Germany, as the Nazis inaugurated a systematic penetration 
into the country's markets. ByearJ,.y 1938, trade volume between Yugo-
27 
slavia and Germany had· trebled its .. 1934 level. In that year Yugo-
slavia sent .to Germany half of its total exports, which represented 
28 
only 2.6% of total German:imports. The South Slav state was rapidly 
becoming a virtual colony.of its Teutonic neighbor, and the increasing 
power of Germany.on the continent after 1938 enhanced German supremacy 
in Yugoslav markets even more. 
The Germans penetrated Slovenian industry. With its sizeable 
Trbovlye (Trifail) mine, Slovenia was responsible for the largest output 
25Louis Adamic,. The·Native's Return (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1934), p. 8Z:-
26 , Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis:en Slovenie," p. 70. 
27Brief Jor Hitler-Stojadinovich talks by ClodiUIJ;1, January 7, 1938. 
DGFP, Series D, Vol. V; pp •. 217-218. 
28stoyan Prib:i,.chevich,. "Nazi Drive to the East," Foreign Policy 
Reports, Vol. XIV (1938), p. 176. 
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of coal in Yugoslavia. An aggressive Nazi policy toward·the coal min-
ing industry was initiated in 1937. By 1940, German investment in coal 
mining rose from 1% of all foreign capital; which represented 75% of 
the total·investment, to 20%. 29 By such tactics, the Germans gained 
control of fully half of the industrial enterprises in Lower Styria 
30 before the war. 
The Slovenes faced not only a monumental struggle for economic 
'. 
survival, but one for more independence within Yugoslavia itself. They 
pressed against the centralistic tendencies in Belgrade for an auton-
omous position within the kingdom. Their cause went unheeded. The 
Serbian rulers disregarded the cultural and political aspirations and 
the economic interests of the Slovenes throughout the entire interwar 
. d 31 perio , Although the Serbs were forced to grant autonomy to.the 
Croats in 1939, they made .no similar concessions to the Slovenes. By, 
and large, the Slovenes remained outside the mainstream of the stormy 
Yugoslav politics, animated as it was by assassinations and by.bitter 
I 
rivalry between the Croats and Serbs. 
The political structure of Slovenia in the interwar years was dom-
inated by the Slovenian Poeple '.s Party of Anton Koroshets. This cleri-
cal party, similar to the Christian Socialist Party in-Austria, stoocl 
for Slovene nationalism,. close .ties with the Vatican, autonomy for 
Slovenia within the Yugoslav state, and anti-bolshevism. .With the aid 
29R. L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1956)~. 180. -·-- ---
30Ferenc, "Le Systeme .d 'Occupation .des Nazis en Slov(nie," p. 71. 
31Dinko Toma~if, "Struggle for Power in Jugoslavia," Journal of 
Central European Affairs, Vol. I (July, 1941), p. 155. 
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of local priests, the party garnered its enormous strength in the vil-
!ages and experienced little competition from other parties. Its news-
paper, Slovenec, was an important voice in Slovenia in the years under 
discussion. The Liberals, who supported a conservative, anti-clerical 
platf.or,m, were concentrated in the cities. The Social Democrats enjoyed 
support from the urban proletariat. Although its influence was slight, 
the Conununist party was growing among young intellectual circles. 
Koroshets began his political career in the Yugoslav state by 
allying himself with anti-Serb forces for a more de-centralized form of 
government. After 1927, he cooperated with the Belgrade centralists in 
order to win concessions for the Slovenes. As testimony to his success, 
the excessive number of Slovene bureaucrats in the national capital 
32 
caused angry comment from both Serbs and Croats. The Slovene leader 
aided King Alexander I, who ruled the country from 1918 until his assas-
sination in 1934, .in the establishment of a dictatorship in 1929. This 
acconunodation did not prevent Alexander from banishing him to an island 
in the Adriatic from 1932 to 1934 for over-zealous appeals on behalf of 
the Slovenes, however. 
Upon his return to active political life and until his death in 
December, 1940, Koroshets exerted a strong influence on Prince Regent 
Paul, who was named nominal head of Yugoslavia in 1934. Koroshets 
allied his forces with those of the reactionary Milan Stojadinovich, 
who became premier in 1935, and assumed the responsible .and pivotal 
post of Minister of the Interior. Koroshets' influence became so ex-
tensive that, early in 1939, he was instrumental in the dismissal of 
32Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 233. 
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Stojadinovich and the appointment of. Dragi(a Cvetkovich as premier. 33 
Although his fortunes. ebbed and waned in Belgrade, Koroshets emerged in 
the·immediate prewar years·as a powerful natio11ral figure. 
Th~,politic&l phi,losophy of Koroshets was complex. It .was char-
acterized first and foremost by extreme Slovene nationalism. The German. 
Foreign Office placed all blame for anti-German feelings in Slovenia in 
34 the late .1930' s squarely upon Koroshets and· his party.. Koroshets. also 
believed sincerely. in the mission of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
Orthodox Balkans .• 35 His dread of bolsheyism led him to take many anti-
democratic stands, and he used his powers ruthlessly-not only against 
36 
communists but aga:f.nst:liberals.as well. Like similar movements else-
where, Slovene political Cathblicism under Koroshets veered in the 
interwar years.from democracy·toward fascism. 
The rising Nazi threat after.1938 posed a di:)..emma to Koroshets 
analogous to that fi;iced.by the clerical-fascist regimes of Dollfuss and 
Schuschnigg in Austria. He began to vacillate·between policies of firm 
resistance to the Germans and appeasement of their demands. The 
Slovenes were violently opposed to the .Anschlus1:1, the union of Germany 
and Austria which took place on March 13, 1938. They feared for the 
Slovene minority in Carinthia and anticipated a German drive toward the 
Adriatic now·that Gel;illany and Yugoslavia had a common border. 
33J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia .in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. ·128-129. 
34 , 
Unsigned Memorandum, December 31, 1937. DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, 
pp. 212-213. 
35 v, Tomasic, "Struggle.for Powerin Jugoslavia," p. 162. 
36 Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 234; Louis Adamic, ~·Native 
Land (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), p. 166. 
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Anti-German demonstrations were reported in Ljubljana at the time of 
37 the Anschluss. The Yugoslav Minister to Berlin, Demitrije Cincar-
Markovich, even suggested then that Hitler guarantee the integrity of 
h G Y 1 f i t 1 h . i . y 1 . 38 t e erman- ugos av rant er o cam t e situat on in ugos avia. · 
Until his death, Koroshets continued to be recognized generally as an 
anti-German force in the country, particularly with his arrests of 
German agitators in the summer of 1938. 39 But a duality in his approach 
to Berlin can be detected as early as March 17, 1938, when the German 
Minister in Belgrade, Viktor van Heeren, reported that Koroshets was 
reconciled toward Anschluss. 40 In the .last months of his career, 
Koroshets urged Prince Regent Paul to increase concessions to the Axis. 
Father Fran Kulovec, who succeeded Koroshets as leader of the 
Slovene People's Party in December., 1940, also vacillated in his for-
eign policy. In early March, 1941, Hitler demanded that Yugoslavia 
sign the Tripartite Pact, which would orient Yugoslavia toward the Axis 
sphere. After the inept invasion of Greece by the Italians in October, 
1940, Yugoslav neutrality had become extremely important to the Germans. 
A quick suppression of Greek resistance was an absolute necessity, if 
the German attack on Russia, planned for May, was to succeed. Hitler 
needed assurance of Yugoslav aquiescence toward the military moves. 
37Dispatch from van Heeren, March 17, 1938. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
V, p. 260; Report from van Heeren, March 19, 1938. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. V, p. 260. 
38 Report by Mackensen, March 17, 1938 .. DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, 
P• 259. 
39The Economist, Vol. CXXXI (1938), p. 588. 
40 Dispatch from van Heeren, March 17, 1938. DGFP, Series D, Vol~ 
V, p. 260. 
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Kulovec was the first member of the Cvetkovich government to agree to 
Hitler's demands. For him, safeguarding the integrity of Slovene soil 
against the German army was of greater importance than resisting fascist 
. 41 
aggression. 
Two days after .the pact was signed, on March 27, 1941, the people 
of Yugoslavia rose up against Cvetkovich's collaboration with Hitler. 
Immediately, Kulovec switched his allegiance and accepted a post in the 
revolutionary government of General Dushan Simovich, formed under the 
boy King Peter Ir. 42 In this act, Kulovec represented the majority of 
43 the Slovenes. No less a commentator than Hitler himself had to admit 
44 that the Slovenes had never been pro-German. 
In a fury at the developments in Belgrade, Hitler held a conference 
in Berlin on the same day as the coup, during which he determined to 
45 
smash Yugoslavia militarily and as a state. A few days later, he 
recalled von Heeren" 
In the tradition of the opportunistic policies of his party, 
Kulovec did not remain true to his stand against the Germans. He still 
hoped, even in the last hours before the end~ to save the Slovenes by 
capitulating to Berlin. On April 5, Kulovec and his associate, Mikha 
Krek, tried to contact the Germans through an intermediary, the Slovak 
41 Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941, p. 219. 
42nragi~a N. Ristit, Yugoslavia's.Revolution of 1941 (University 
Park: Pennsylvania.State University Press, 1966), pp. 110-llL 
43Nicholas Mirkovich, 11J4goslavia's Choice," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
XX (1941), p. 141. 
44Minutes .of conference in Berlin by Christian, March 27, 1941. 
DGFP .• Series D, Vol. XII, p. 373. 
45 Ibid. 
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Chargf d'Affaires in Belgrade. There was only a skeletal staff left in 
the German Ministry in the.Yugoslav capital. A Chargf d'Affaires re-. 
ported to Berlin what the Slovak diplomat ha,d told him. It was a sad 
entry.in the German·Foreign Ministry archives: 
The Slovene leaders regarded the .war as inevitable. It· 
would bring about the.end of Yugoslavia. If no separate so-
lution could be found for Slovenia, the Slovenes, like the. 
Croats, would have to die with the Serbs. Since, however, 
their .country was more important to them than the Yugoslav 
State, they were seeking another way out. This had, in any. 
case, to be found·in.the cooperation with Germany. There 
were two possibilities: 
1. An . independent Slovenia. 
2. A state consisting of Slovenia and Croatia. 
In Slovenia there was fear, however, that Germany had 
other plans., which would amount. to a partition of Slovenia 
••• Unfortunately here in Belgrade the Slovene leaders, be~ 
cause of Serbian vigilance, had no opportunity to establish 
direct contact with officials of the Reich. If it be~ame 
known here what they were contemplating; they would certainly 
be killed.46 
The approach.· was unheeded by the Germans • Kulovec was killed in the 
Belgrade bombings the next day, by which Hitler began his war on Yugo-
slavia without warning. Kr.ek subsequently became leader-in-exile of 
the Slovene People's Party. 
There we:re enough ambiguities in Slovene .nationalism and Slovene 
politics vi~-'a-vis Hitler's aggressive moves to·lead the Nazis to sup-
pose that, in so.me· parts of Slovenia at any rate, they .would be well 
received after their occupation of the country. Moreover, in the .inter-
war years; condition~ had been,ripe for the appearance of a demagogue: 
in Slovenia; the promise of a new order.was bound to·have·an.appeal~ 
Although there .was al!lple.evidence.that German·domination would be 
46 Report by Feine, April 5, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 
464. 
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unacceptabl~ to the populace, a very real question in April, 1941, was 
how strong Slovene nationalism would prove in withstanding Hitler's on-
slaught. 
CHAPTER III 
NAZI POLICY AND SLOVENIA: JANUARY, 1933 TO JULY, 1941 
The position of Slovenia in Hitler's larger plans for Europe was 
unclear after his rise to power in Berlin on January 30, 1933, until 
the Simovich coup ~'~tat in Belgrade on March 27, 1941. A review of 
German diplomacy toward Slovenia within that time span reveals an am-
bivalence between maintaining the integrity of the province or shatter-
ing it. Although Germany became intimately involved in Slovenian af-
fairs through the instrument of the German.minority there, Hitler con-
sistently forestalled the Italians and Hungarians from border viola-
tions. After March .27 through the summer of 1941, he moved with light-
ning speed in an attempt, modified by the exigencies of existing power 
politics, to recreate the ancient crownlands of the Habsburg Empire on 
Slovene territory. 
Three years earlier, in a conference with Stojadinovich, Hitler 
had anticipated in a figure of speech this final diplomatic approach 
toward Slovenia. He had assured Stojadinovich at that time that he had 
discarded his "Viennese spectacles" in viewing Yugoslavia. This im-
plied that he was not a champion of either Austrian or Hungarian re-
visionism and that he had no desire to partition Yugoslavia into the 
component parts of the defunct Habsburg Empire. His territorial aims, 
he averred, ended at the Austro-Yugoslav border as established by the 
25 
26 
treaties of St. Germain and Trianon. 1 Hitler reaffirmed this resolve 
to the world on October 6, 1939, before the Reichstag: 
Immediately after the Anaschluss became an accomplished 
fact I informed Yugoslavia that the frontier in common with 
that country would henceforth be regarded as unalterable by 
Germany and that we wished only to live in peace and friend-
ship with that country.2 
If this was all that he had said in his voluminous speeches, the 
Slovenes would have rested easier. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, Hitler seemedto put on and 
take off his "Viennese spectacles" at will. His Reichstag speech of 
April 28, 1939, for example~ gave rise to much speculation that he con-
sidered himself heir to the Habsburg Empire. 3 In this address, he de-
clared that .the Ostmark of medieval days had developed into "the .crown-
lands and nucleus of the five-century-old German Empire with Vienna as 
the capital of the German Reich of that period." Stressing the conti-
nuity between the first German Reich and that of his own formation, he 
underscored his goal to reestablish "the historic unity of German living 
4 
space." 
Thus, Hitler justified his advent to power in Austria by posing as 
a direct heir to the Habsburgs. What would prevent him from pressing 
his claims further into Slovenia, which had been at the core of the 
historic Austrian crownlands? Should he choose to do so, the 
1ttinutes by van Heeren, January 17, 1938. DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, 
pp. 228-229. 
2Adolph Hitler,~ New Order (edited by Raoul de Roussy de Sales, 
New York: Reyna! and Hitchcock, 1941), p, 743. 
3F. Elwin Jones, The Attack from Within (London, 1939), p. 61. 
4Hitler, ~ New Order, pp, 635-636, 676. 
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reincorporation of Lower Styria into Reic~l!_ (Reich province) Styria 
v 
and of the Meza Valley, Dravograd and the Commune of Jezersko into 
Reich~~~~ Carinthia would be foregone conclusions. Certainly, Hitler's 
Hungarian allies could expect the return of Prekmurje, if any historic 
principle were invoked in Slovenia. Carniola would be impossible· to 
absorb in the Reich completely, since Hitler's Italian allies already 
possessed a western strip of that crownland and would be sure to demand 
more of it. However these problems connected with a German extension 
into the former Habsburg territories in Yugoslavia would be resolved, 
suspicions that Hitler had revisionist ideas about Slovenia at least 
two years before the Yugoslav invasion had foundation. 
The duality in the Nazi approach to Slovenia is evident not only 
in Hitler's pronouncements to leading statesmen and to the world at 
large, but also in his policies toward the German minority in the prov-
ince. On the one hand, Berlin worked within legal international bounds 
for the benefit of the Germans in Slovenia; on the other, it used these 
people as a focal point for undercover aggression against constituted 
Yugoslav authorities. Whether this duality indicated that Hitler plan-
ned to attack Slovenia eventually, or that he wanted merely to include 
it in the German sphere of influence, is open to debate. The point of 
interest here is that he maintained a double-tracked policy regarding 
the Germans in Slovenia until March 27, 1941. 
Hitler based much of his diplomacy with eastern European states 
upon the situation of the German minorities within their borders. The 
Flihrer posed as the champion of all Germans abroad. In his Reichstag 
speech of March 23, 1933, he said: 
We have particularly at heart the fate of the Germans 
living beyond the frontiers of Germany who are allied with 
us in speech, culture, and customs and have to m~ke a hard 
fight to retain these values. The· national Government is . 
resolved to use all.the means at its disposal to support 
th~ rights internationally guaranteed to the German minor-
ities.5 
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His concern embraced both the .Reichsdeutsche or Auslandsdeutsche (Ger-
man-national abroad) and the Volksdeutsche or Volkszugeh~rige (ethnic 
German, but non-citizen of Germany~ residing abroad). In order to qual-
ify as Volksdeutsch, a person had to have some German blood, not just 
knowledge of the .German language and customs. Hitler's protection ex-
tended.to a Volksdeutsche.regardless of his citizenship status in 
another.coiJntry and regardless ofwhether he traced his origins to 
Austria rather than to Germany proper, even before Anschluss. 
To Hitler's good fortune, the German-minority in Slovenia nursed 
many grievances against local authorities in the interwar.years. Ac~ 
cording to the German-view, the Yugoslav gc;>vernment placed unreasonable 
res'trictions upon its German, subjects, sucq as prohibiti~g them from 
owning property-with:i,n fifty kilometers of the border. Members of the 
minority were incensed at the anti-German tone of the newspaper 
Slovenec, as well as "general chicaneries", practiced against them. 
They further deman9ed that classes in the German language with teachers 
of German origin and that unhampered.German cooperative organizations 
and societies be.permitted. 6 . 
The nature of the German grievances indicates that the Slovenian 
authorities were preoccupied .with strengthening the.Slavic elements in 
their land. Ce~tainly there was some foundation to the charge that the 
5 Ibid., p. 158. 
6unsigned Memorandum; December 31, 1937. DGFP, Series D, .Vol. V, 
p. 213. 
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blatant disregard·of German.minority rights in Slovenia would result in 
"the entire pulverization of·the German folk·group in Slovenia. 117 As 
shall be pointed out later, however, some of the restrictions imposed 
upon the Germans were necessitated by-consideration of Yugoslavian 
national security. In any case, the controls-could ha,rdly be called 
terroristic in character. 
A Volksdeutsch organization which experienced poor relations with 
the Slovene authorities in the_immediate prewar years was the Swabian-
German Cultural.Union (Schw!bisch-deutscher Kulturbund). Founded in 
1920 in Novi Sad (Neusatz), the organization encompassed all ethrtic 
Germans in Yugoslavia. Its name derived from the fact that Germans 
living along the Danube in Southeastern Europe were commonly called 
Swabians. 8 The Maribor and Ljubljana branches of the Kulturbund were 
dissolved by orde.r of the provincial governor in 1935 and 1936 respec-
tively for covert political activities. Because of such punitive 
9 
actions, only a few groups were operative in Slovenia by 1937. After 
Anschluss, concessions were made to the organization, and it promptly, 
extended.its organization into twenty-nine distriGts of Slovenia. 10 
Regulations.which restricted German teachers and the German lan~ 
guage in schools for children of the German minority aroused particular 
hostility. Because German teachers were usually _transferred from 
7 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XIX (1936), p. 855. 
8G. C. Paikert, The Danube _Swabians (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1967), p. L 
9 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XIX (1936), pp, 125, 348-349; Vol. 
XX (1937), p. 123. 
lOPaikert, The Danube Swabians, p. 270. 
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German to purely.Slovenian communities, by 1936 hardly a dozen German 
teachers were left in the Kotevje area, which was 89% German, while the. 
Slovenian teachers there numbered fifty. 11 The Slovene authorities 
clearly were following a-course of Entdeutschungspolitik (de-germani-
zation) among youthful Volksdeutschen. 
The German-Foreign Office vigorously espoused the cause of the 
Slovenian Germans while respecting the legal framework of the Yugoslav 
government. As German demands upon Belgrade became more substantial 
and more insistent after Anschluss, the situation of the German minor-
ity in Slovenia be~ame more crucial to the betterment of German-
Yugoslav relations .in general. Right after he became premier, Cvetko-
vich promised the German minister in Belgrade that he.would make re-
dresses for violations.in Slovenia. Von Heeren remarked: 
It was to be·plainly inferred from the content and form 
of the conver.sation that the Yugoslav Minister President is 
extremely anxious to dissipate any possible German mistrust 
for him personally and is even ready to make sacrifices to 
this end. The further development of the situation of the 
Germans in Slovenia will best show how far he is prepared to 
go.12 · 
During talks between Prince·. Regent Paul and Hitler a few months later, 
the treatment of the Slovenian Germans was raised by the German For-
eign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. 13 That Slovenian problems re-
ceived attention from the highest quarters underscores their importance 
in the diplomatic interchange of the immediate prewar period. 
11ner Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XIX (1936), p. 855. 
12 Report by von Heeren, February 11, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
V, pp. 390-391. 
13 Memorandum by Ribbentrop, June 5, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
VI, p. 637. 
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Despite all the German protests on their behalf, the situation of 
the German minority in Slovenia steadily worsened. By the time World 
War II began, anti-German feeling in Yugoslavia had reached enormous 
proportions. Von Heeren asked permission in.May, 1940, to return Reich 
14 
nationals to Germany, because of the many outrages against themo He 
also counseled that no more German. cultural events be held in order to 
. G , 'd 15 prevent anti- erman inci ents. 
Since the deep-seated problems of German minorities in Slavic 
states seemed insoluble through traditional means, Hitler toyed with a 
radical solution. In his Reichstag speech of October 6, 1939, he said: 
The most important task (is) to establish a new order of 
ethnographic conditions, that is to say, resettlement of 
nationalities in such a manner that the process ultimately 
results in the obtaining of better dividing lines than is the 
case at present,o,The east and south of Europe are to a large 
extent filled with splinters of the German nationality, whose 
existence they cannot maintaino 
In their very existence lie the reason and cause for con-
tinual international disturbances. In this age of the principle 
of nationalities and of racial ideals, it is utopian to believe 
that members of a highly developed people can be assimilated 
without trouble. 
It is therefore essential for a far-sighted ordering of 
the life of Europe that a resettlement should be undertaken.16 
In other words, Hitler advocated moving Germans from southeastern 
Europe into the Fatherland in the interest of peace. He had inaugurated 
his program of mass transfers of population. 
Hitler's October 6 speech sent the Yugoslav German community into 
14 Telegram from van Heeren, May 11, 1940. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
IX, p. 357. 
15 Report from von Heeren, May 20, 1940. DGFP, Series D, Vol. IX, 
p. 384. 
16Hitler, ~ New Order, pp. 737-738. 
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an uproar. 17 Ernst Freiherr von Weizs~cker, State Secretary in the 
Foreign Ministry, hastily sought to reassure the Yugoslav Germans that 
no immediate population exchanges were immine~t. Only voluntary re-
patriate$ were wanted in Germany, he explained, and minority problems 
in Yugoslavia were not acute enough at the present time to warrant re-
settlement.18 It would be two more years before Hitler's words would 
directly affect the people of Slovenia. 
German policy toward Slovenia did not remain solely within the 
realms of normal diplomatic channels. That the Nazis also used an 
undercover approach to infiltra~e into the province is evident. The 
members of the German minority cooperated with the .Nazi regime to pro-
mote German hegemony which was already proceeding rapidly through sys-
tematic German economic penetration of Yugoslavia. After Anschluss, 
German fifth column activities .seemed to grow in intensity and sinister 
qualities. 
To the world of rational international relations; Germany was an 
aggressor nation against Slovenia even before it violated any:borders, 
and the Germans living in Slovenia were guilty of nothing.leas than 
high treason. However, Nazi ideology offered a justification for thts 
attack from within. According to Nazi theoreticians, a state had 
Schutzrecht, or the right to protect its folk groups scattered th;ough-
out the world. Since this Schutzrecht knew no boundarie$, a state 
could interfere in the.internal affairs of other states on behalf .of 
17 Report from von Heeren; 0Gtober 22, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
VIII, p. 332. 
18 ,, Weizsacker to von Heeren, October 28, 1939. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. VIII, p. 352. 
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its Volk. 19 Further, the Nazi concepts of Staatsangehorige and 
Volksangeh'6rige made loyalty to the state in which one lived relatively 
unimportant. Staatsangehorige designated the citizen of a state. For 
Germans living outside the Reich, this was their secondary affiliation. 
VolksangehBrige meant member of a nation. All Germans living outside 
the Reich, regardless of what passports they carried, were to consider 
20 this as their primary status. The fifth column was given a cloak of 
respectability. 
The Swabian German Cultural Union was a major subversive organiza-
tion in Yugoslavia. After 1938, the previously moderate Kulturbund was 
thoroughly infiltrated .with Nazi ideas through its merger with the 
Renovation Movement (Erneuerungsbewegung), a radical group led by 
Branimir Altgayer and Sepp Janko. During the years before the invasion, 
Kulturbund members in Slovenia spied for the Germanso They reported on 
the economy of the country, the administration, the armaments industry, 
the army and the police to German espionage headquarters in Graz 
(Gradec), Klagenfurt,. Salzburg and Vienna, 21 Many of the illegal 
activities of the group were carried out under the guise of innocent 
sports or musical events. 
Another important organization for subversion in the interwar 
period was the Liaison Office for Ethnic.Germans or VOMI (Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle), a secret semi-party, semi-state agency run by SS officers 
19 . Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939~1945 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 45. 
20 Jones, The Attack from Within, p, 90. 
21 Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occ~pation des Nazis en Slovlnie," pp. 
52-53. 
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for cooroinating activities relating to German minorities. It was 
" directed by,SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Werner Lorenz from 1937 to 1945. From 
1938 to 1940, VOMI held at position on national minority questions su~ 
perior to all government agencies, including the Foreign Office. 22 
VOMI's invqlvement in Slovenia may be judged by the promise of one of 
its officials to cut down still further the .. local contacts between 
Styria and Lower Styria, when orders were issued to keep the German ' 
23 
national group in Yugoslavia quiet in.1939. 
The German,Foreign Institute played a decisive role in Volks-
deutsch affairs during the Hitler era. Organized originally in 1917 by 
Theodor G. Wanner to promote the interests of Germans abroad, the DAI 
became·a Nazi instrument by 1934 under the leadership of President Karl 
Str81in, the Nazi burgomaster of Stuttgart, and Secretary General 
Richard Csaki. It was widely regarded as.a hotbed of Nazi propaganda. 
No .student can have.a complete view of Volksdeutsch patterns before and 
during World War II without bearing in.mind .the role and significance 
of the DAI. 24 
The DAI's monthly journal, Der Auslandsdeutsche, later renamed 
Deutschtum im Ausland, was undoubtedly of great moment to the Germans 
of Slovenia in the.twenties and thirties. It was one.of the plethora 
of German publications for the minorities of southeastern Europe under 
2
~acAlister Brown, "The Third .Reich's Mobilization of the German 
Fifth Column in Eastern Europe;" Journal of Central European Affairs, 
Vol~ XIX (1959), pp. 129, 130-131, 133, 135, 148. . 
23 · Note.by Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department, April 
15, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. VI; p. 256. 
24Paikert, The Danube Swabians, pp, 109-110, 112-113. 
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the supervision of propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. 25 Its articles 
were designed to increase the German consciousness of all Germans out-
side the Reich and to foster their association with the Fatherland. 
Stuttgart was heavily advertised as the city of Germandom outside the 
Reich ("die _Stadt des Auslandsdeutschtums"). Such propaganda, although 
innocent enough on the surface, posed a distinct threat to the loyalty 
which Belgrade could expect from the German minority within the Yugoslav 
borders. 
The German diplomatic missions were also involved in fifth-
column activities. The extent of this problem in Slovenia can be judg-
ed by the events there in the summer of 1939. Cincar-Markovich, who 
had become Foreign Minister under Cvetkovich, complained to Ribbentrop 
during the talks between Prince Regent Paul and Hitler about the new 
26 German counsul in Maribor named Stechele. Subsequently, Cincar-
Markovich requested Stechele I S'removal because the consul .was viewed 
with gravest mistrust by Slovene authorities, Stechele was transferred 
27 to Bulgaria in August. 
The German minister in Belgrade, as many other German career dip-
lomats in southeastern Europe, exhibited uneasiness over the use of his 
ministry for indelicate intrusions into internal Yugoslav affairs. Be-
tween 1925 and 1937, von Heeren returned money and propaganda material 
received by diplomatic mail from the DAI and other agencies. 28 In 1939, 
25Brown, "The Third Reich's Mobilization of the German Fifth 
Column in Eastern Europe," p, 141. 
26 Memorandum by Ribbentrop, June 5, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
VI, p. 637. 
27Editors' Note, DGFP, Series D, Vol, VI, p. 637. 
28p 'k Th D b S b' 274 a1 ert, e anu e wa 1ans, p, , 
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he sent a strongly worded dispatch to Berlin against the disturbances. 
perpetrated by leaders .of the. Renovation Movement and counselled that 
stirring up the Volksdeutschen was politically undesirable. 29 
German businessmen in. Slovenia apparently collabo.rated with the 
Third Rei.ch in the acquisition of strategically located land. Railway 
lines and roads running through .the passes of Slovenia have tradition-
ally had great geopolitical significance. Routes from Vienna to Maribor 
to Trieste or Rijeka (Fiume) were crucial in connecting Central Europe. 
with the Adriatic Sea. It was widely reported in British circles in. 
the mid-1930's that persons friendly to the Nazis were purchasing land-
ed estates adjacent to the railroad right of way. In 1936, the Slovene 
authoritie.s prqhibited the transfer of such property to member.a of .the 
German community. The following year, the law restricting German owner-
ship of land within fifty kilometers of the Yugoslav border was 
30 passed. Although the Germans indignantly protested these restric-
tions, they still found ingenious ways to circumvent them. In the 
summer of 1938, a poor Slovene peasant was reported to have purchased 
strategic property valued at 4,200 pounds as a cover for a German mer-
- 31 
chanto It was speculated that funds for land transactions favorable 
to German interests in .Slovenia originated with the Nazi party. 
Pressures against Slovenia were not confined to Berlin's devious 
intrigues among the .Slovenian Volksdeutschen and Reichsdeutschen. The 
German allies, Hungary and Italy, both coveted Slovene territory. Until 
29nispatch from von Heeren, April 13, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
VI, pp. 234-235. 
30 · Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XX (1937), p. 499. 
31Jones, The Attack from Within, pp. ll~-115. 
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the Simovich coup ~'~tat, however, Hitler seemed steadfast in hi.s re-
solve to keep Yugoslavia geographically intact, albeit: as a.German-
dominated satellite. in his new Europe. 
Throughout the. inte,rwar period, the Hungarians persistently ad-
vanced revisionist claims, which included Prek.murje, agaim;t Yugoslavia. 
During 1937 and 1938, the Yugoslavs, in conjunction with their allies 
in the Little Entent:e, the Czechoslovakians and Rumanians, tried to 
ward off the Hungarian threat with a non-aggression pact" Budapest 
would not sign any agreement, however, unless .concrete concessions w~re 
made by the Little Entente powers in favor of the Hungarian minorities 
within their borders. Bent upon the destruction of the Little Entente, 
Hitler urged the Hungarian and Yugoslav prime ministers to settle their. 
diffe:rences directly, witho,ut reference .to Bucharest and Prague. He 
even offered .to back a Hungarian-Yugoslav treaty on the minority ques~ 
tion with "an absolutely binding guarantee, which would also apply mil-
32 itarily in ca.se Hungary should violate the Yugoslav border." Though 
nothing more was heard about the proposed German guarantee after the, 
collapse ,of·the Little Entente in .late 1938, a.Hungarian-Yugoslav 
treaty of friendship was finally signed in December, 1940" 
While he, was trying to hold.back.the Hungarians, Hitler was also 
faced with the Italians, who were equally as desirous of splitting up 
the South Slav stat:e, The Italian-Yugoslav pact of friendship of March, 
1937, did not deter Rome from pressing its cause against Yugoslavia. 
The Italians used the German.liquidation of Czechoslovakia in March, 
32 . Report by ~eissner, November 25, 1937. DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, 
p. 201. Report by von Heeren, January 17, 1938. DGFP, Series D, Vol.. 
v, p. 225. 
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1939, to blackmail Hitl~r. During the same month, the Italian Foreign 
Minister Galeazzo Ciano met with th,e German Ambassador in Rome, Hans 
Georg von Mac;ke,nsen. Ciano impressed upon Mackensen that, while Rome 
was disinterested in Czechoslovakia, it was deeply concerned with Yugo-
slavia. The Italians wanted the Germans to leave affairs on the 
33 Adriatic shores completely .to them. Capitulating to Mussolini, the. 
Nazis circulated an_ order sta,ting that "our attitude regarding all 
national community and minority problems in th.e Mediterranean countries 
34 
must be adjusted to meet the wi13hes of the Italian government," 
For all their blustering, the .Italians.realized that they.would be 
unable to move against Yugoslavia without German aid, Consequently, 
the general staff of the Italian army forwarded to the Germans two at-
tack plans on Yugoslavia in August, 1940. The first plan was to be 
carried out solely by the .Italians, but it in~olved the movement of 
Italian troops .through German territory in Carinthia and Styria, as 
well as 5,000 German motor .vehicles. The alternative plan included a. 
German advance through Styria and Carinthia, along with an Italian .at-
35 tack. Th G t ' d . h I 1· 36 e· ermans.were no intereste int ese. ta 1,an overtures. 
Mussolini felt obliged to tell Hitler on August 24 that recent Italian 
military.measures ,at the Yugoslav border were only precautionary and 
33 Memorandum by.Mackensen, March 17, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
VI, pp. 15-16. Memorandum by Mackensen, March 20-;-I"939. DGFP, Series 
D, Vol •. VI, pp. 48-49. 
34 Memorandum by Ribbentrop, March 25, 1939. DGFP, Series D, VoL 
VI, p. 113. 
35 Report by Rintelen, August 9, 1940. DGFP, Series D, Vol. X, 
p. 482 •. 
36 Editors' Note. DGFP, Series D, Vol. X, p. 483. 
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prompted by the fact that the country was hostile to the Axis. 37 
All of Hitler's diplomacy designed to bring a docile Yugoslavia 
within his orbit was jeopardized by the change in government in Belgrade 
on March 27, 1941. As has been discussed, he determined suddenly to 
smash Yugoslavia militarily and as a state during a conference in 
Berlin the same day as the coup, Later that day, Hitler received the 
Hungarian Minis.ter to Berlin, D;;me Sztoj ay. The F~hrer promised to 
respect Hungarian revisionist desires and to permit Hungarian military 
measures in Yugoslavia. As far as he was concerned, he said, the Ger-
man aspirations in the doomed country were only for parts of Carinthia 
38 
and Styria lost by Austria in the Treaty of St. Germain. 
Axis military actic;m against Slovenia swiftly followed the initial 
bombing of Belgrade on April 6. On April 9, the German army entered 
Maribor and proceeded to occupy the regions east of the Sava (Sau, 
Save) river. The Italian army took possession of Ljubljana and the 
rest of the province on April 11. 
Hungarian participation in th.e dismemberment of Yugoslavia was 
delayed by the suicide of Premier Paul Teleki on April 2. As an honor-
able diplomat, Teleki despaired over the projected Hungarian abrogation 
of the Hungarian-Yugoslav trea,ty of friendship. On April 3, Admiral 
Nicholas Horthy, the Hungarian regent, sanctimoniously explained to 
Hitler that "the conflict of conscience confronting us .•. compels us to 
request that.the German Army Command assign to our troops only,such 
37Mussolini to Hitler, August 24, 1940. DGFP, Series D, Vol. X, 
p. 538. 
38 Memorandum by Hewel, March.27, 1941, DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
pp. 369-370. 
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tasks as are reconcilable with our conscience. 1139 Composure was quickly 
regained, however, and Horthy issued a manifesto on April 11 affirming 
his duty to reclaim former Hungarian territories in Yugoslavia in the 
40 interests of the Hungarians living there. Between April 11 and 13, 
the Hungarian army took Prekmurje. 
Slovene resistance to the Axis invasions; while more pronounced 
than elsewhere in Yugoslavia, was ineffectual and hindered by sabotage. 
The Slovenian National Council, established on April 6 under the 
leadership of the last governor or ban of Slovenia, Dr. Marko Natla6en, 
actually appealed .to the Germans for aid, presumably in an attempt.to 
save the province. 41 · Slovenian Volksdeutschen heeded a secret direc-
tive from Hitler to evade the Yugoslav draft and gave open aid to the 
. d ' 1 1 ' h K v · d · · 42 inva ers, particu ar yin t e ocevJe istrict. About 150 German 
refugees from Lower Styria were recruited to serve as guides for the 
d ' G '1' h' 43 a vancing erman mi itary mac ine. When the Yugoslav armed forces 
capitulated unconditionally on April 17, Slovenia was completely sub-
clued. 
On April 12, 1941, six days after the German invasion of 
39 Horthy to Hitler, April 3, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
pc 44 7, 
40 Report from Ermannsdorff, April 11, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XII, p. 510, 
41 Dusan Plenca, "Le Mouvement de Lib~ration Nationale en Yougo-
slavie et les Allies," in European Resistance Movements, 1939-~, 
(London: Pergamon, 1964),. p. 495, 
42 · Paikert, The Danube Swabians, pp. 276-277. Arnez, Slovenia in 
European Affairs:-I). 16. 
43 Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis en Slov~nie," p. 55, 
41 
44 Yugoslavia, Hitler circulated a directive for splitting up the country. 
Although negotiations to ratify clauses dealing with Slovenia were not 
completed until several months later, the directive was authoritative 
and definitive in establishing the ,Nazi policy for the occupation of 
Slovenia. Its provisions divided the province among Italy, Germany and 
Hungary roughly according to pre-1918 frontiers. (See Map III.) 
German territorial gains in Slovenia were enlarged beyond Hitler's 
aspirations, a~ expressed on March.27, to include much of Carniola. 
Lower Styria, increased to tqe south by a strip of about ninety.kilom-
eters in breadth and te.n to fifteen kilometers in depth, was. reincorpo-
rated into Reichsgau Styria. The addition included the Kr~ko polje. 
(plain) in the southeastern corner of Lower Carniola (Unterkrain, Basse-
Carniole). v The parts of Carinthia lost in 1919 (the Meza Valley, 
Dravograd and the Commune of Jezersko) and Upper Carniola (Oberkrain, 
Haute~Carniole), were placed un4er the administrative control of 
Reichsgau Carinth:La. B~cause the various Carinthian gains in 1941 were 
administered as a unit, for purposes of simplification the term Upper 
Carniola will henceforth include them, unless specified otherwise. The 
line delineating Upper Carniola from that part of Carniola awarded to 
Italy, called the .Province of Ljubljana (Lubiana) by the Italians, ran 
to the south of the upper course of the Sava river, but north of 
Ljubljana. 
The division of Carniola was a cqmpromise between conflicting 
Italian and Germaninterests.there, with more weight accorded.to the 
44 Margaret Carlyle, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1939-
1946 •. Vol. II, Hitler's Europe (London:-Royal Institute of Inter----
national Affairs, 1954), pp. 329-331. 
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latter. Although Ljubljana fell inside the Italian zone of occupation, 
Berlin received the valuable coal fields of the Sava basin and the 
Ljubljana-Zidani Most-Zagreb (Agram) railway. Ribbentrop and Ciano met 
in Vienna on April 21.to discuss the border. Though dissatisfied with 
Rome's procurement of only the poorest seGtions of Carniola, Ciano was 
unable to obtain any noteworthy modifications of the April 12, line. 45 
On July 8, 1941, an agreement was signed to settle the common German-
Italian frontier in Slovenia. 
Although Hitler accorded Yugoslav territory beyond the Mura river, 
that is to say, Prekmurje, to .the Hungarians on April 12, Berlin qual-
ified this bequest during the following month. Agreement was reached 
in early May that four German villages in the northwestern corner of 
the district would eventually be annexed to the .Reich and that Volks-
deutschen in the northeastern corner would be resettled within Germany 
at a later date. Neither provision was ever carried into effect, how-
ever. On May 30, Budapest also gave oil concessions in Prekmurje to 
46 the Germans. 
To complete the legal work involved in establishing the new bor-
ders of Germany on former Slovene territory, Berlin signed a treaty 
with the newly-created state of Croatia on May 13. The document stip-
ulated that the German-Croatian frontier would correspond to the former 
administrative boundary between Styria and Croatia in.the Habsburg 
Empire. 
When all the negotiations were concluded, Slovenia as·it had 
45 ~ Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis en Slovenie," p. 49. 
46clodium to Ribbentrop, May 31, 1941. ~' Series D, Vol. XII, 
p. 49. 
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existed within Yugoslavia, was radically partitioned. Its territory 
and population were assigned as follows: 10,261 square kilometers with 
798,700 people to Germany; 4,551 square kilometers with 336,279 people 
to Italy; and 998 square kilometers with 102,867 people to Hungary. 47 
Despite Hitler's pose as the restorer of ancient German lands, the new 
boundaries were determined more by considerations of power politics 
than by historic principle. Hitler never demanded all of Carniola, to 
which he had as much "historic right" as to Lower Styria and the small 
districts.of Carinthia annexed to Yugoslavia in 1919. Forced to pla-
cate his Italian allies, who were extremely jealous of any German in-
trusion into Yugoslavia, he felt no apparent compunction about slicing 
up Carniola at will. For him, the province even ceased to have a past, 
for the Nazis often referred to Upper Carniola simply as South 
Carinthia (sndk~rnten). Further, the German claim for the four vill-
ages in Prekmurje ignor~d the past integrity of that region. As far 
as Slovenia was concerned, "the historic unity of German living space" 
had very little meaning in the struggle over the spoils between.March 
27, and the summer of 1941. 
47Ferenc; "Le Syst~e d'Occupation des Nazis en Slov~nie," p. 49. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE GERMANIZATION OF SLOVENIA 
The Nazi blueprint for a."New Order" in Europe was based on an ex-
tension of the frontiers of Germany to create a living space (Lebensraum) 
for the German people. From within the limits of this Greater German 
Reich, all non-German inhabitants were to be expelled. Their places 
were to be filled by Germans found outside the new boundaries--not only 
German nationals residing abroad, but also ethnic Germans whose fore-
fathers had wandered from the Fatherland as much as centuries before. 
Through a radical readjustment of the geographic as well as the demo-
graphic map of Europe, German blood was to be consolidated. 
The Slovene territory occupied by Germany in April, 1941, was 
scheduled to be included legally in the Greater German Reich. It was 
the last of several additions to the German Lebensraum carried to var-
ious stages of incorporation under Hitler: Austria; fully amalgamated 
in 1938; Bohemia and Moravia, included as.a Protectorate in 1939; the 
western s.ection of Poland, incorporated in 1939; and Alsace, Lorraine 
and Luxembourg, occupied in.1940 and scheduled for incorporation. As 
central Europe was thus consolidated, Uppel," Carniola within Gau 
Carinthia and Lower Styria within Gau Styria became frontier zones at 
the southernmost extension of Greater Germany. (See Map IV.) 
Immediately upon their conquest of Yugoslavia, the Nazis began a 
program of germanization (Eindeutschung) in Slovenia to carry .out the 
45 
46 
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Ft'hrer's directive that the land be made German once again. How the 
Nazis adapted their resettlement (Umsiedlung) program to Slovenia and 
the Slovenes will be the major consideration of this chapter, since re-
settlement was the most far-reaching as well as most dramatic aspect of 
germanization. Among questions to.be investigated are the.following: 
What was the administrative organization of the Nazi occupation? How 
were the Nazis able to justify the acceptance of some Slovenes as 
Germans? What were the original plans for the transformation of 
Slovenia into a German l~nd? What actions were actually carried out? 
Although Upper Carniola was attached to Carinthia, and Lower Styria 
to Styria, the.Slovene provinces were to be administered as separate 
units until they were actually incorporated into the Reich. The supreme 
command in each territory was exercised by a Chief of Civil Administra-
tion (Chef der Zivilverwaltung). Only in matters pertaining to the 
post, telegraph, railways and customs was there central direction from 
competent ministries in Berlin. For all 'else, each Chief of Civil Ad-
ministration was responsible directly to Hitler through Hans Lammers, 
Chief of the Reich Chancellory. He was given an independent budget 
with the widest scope of power, in order to carry out the task of pre-
1 paring the land for reattachment to the Fatherland. 
The special status of Upper Carniola and Lower Sty~ia, as opposed 
to the rest of the Reich, was underscored by the fact that Reich Germans 
were separated from occupied Slovene territories by internal frontiers. 
Special travel permits into the area were required not only for private 
1clifton J, Child, '~olitical Structure of Hitler's Europe,'' in 
Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., Survey of International Affairs, 





citizens but for Nazi party members as well. 2 · 
The Chief of Civil Administration in both Lower Styria and Upper 
Carniola was aiso Gauleiter and Reichstatthalter (provincial leader of 
the NSDAP and governor; only the first title was generally used) of 
Styria and Carinthia respectively. The Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Sieg-
fried Ueberreither, entered into his duties as Chief of the Civil Ad-
ministration for Lower Styria on April 14, 1941. Franz Kutschera, act-
ing Gauleiter of Carinthia at the time, took over as Chief of the Civil 
Administration for Upper Carniola between April 15 and 30 of the same 
year. On November 30, 1941, he was succeeded by the incoming Gauleiter 
of Carinthia, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, who had previously been Gauleiter 
of Salzburg. 
The decision on when to incbrporate Slovene regions into the Reich 
hinged upon the consummation of the germanization effort. Shortly after 
the occupatio~, a five-man commission .toured Lower Styria and Upper 
Carniola to take an inventory on the new German acquisitions. The com-
mission reported 615,000 people in Lower Styria and in the former 
Carinthian districts with the density of the Slovene population ranging 
from 78 to 100% in separate sections. In Upper Carniola, the population 
of 209,500 people was classed as 100% Slovenian. Th~ German population 
of Maribor, the important German center, was set at 10% of the total. 3 
Since the Nazi figures corroborated earlier studies which showed 
2Ibid., p. 98. 
311zusarnmenfassender Bericht der Kommission die mit der Bestandsauf-
nahme in den Gebieten der Untersteiermark und Sti.dkarnten beauftragt· 
war," September 15, 1941, United States .National Archives Microfilm 
Publication, Microcopy T-81, Records of the National Socialist German 
Labor Party (NSDAP), Roll 284, Frames~407072-95. (Hereafter cited 
as T-81/284/2407072-95). 
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Slovenia as overwhelming South Slav, the job of making Slovenia a German 
land presented formidable problems. 
In order to resolve this difficulty, Nazi pseudo-anthropology went 
to work. Although Slovenes were technically non-German, Nazi theorists 
had come up during the inter-war period with a unique theory by which a 
portion of them could be saved for Germandom. Many Slovenes, according 
to this train of thought, must be counted as a part of the whole German 
ethnic body because they were indifferent to their Slavic blood and had 
a "German outlook." These Slovenes formed a distinct race, for which 
the term Windisch was resurrected and given new status. The pro-German 
or half-germanized Wends might be .viewed as members of a dying Slavic 
nation. Martin Wutte had first brought the distinction among Germans, 
Wends, and Slovenes to the attention .of the world in 1929. Throughout 
the thirties 7 German nationalist propaganda was filled with references 
4 to the Wends and their eligibility for inclusion in the German realm. 
If it was difficult to separate Germans from Slovenes, as in the 
census of 1910, it was even more troubleso.me to separate Wends from 
Slovenes, for both spoke the same tongue. Helmut Carstanjen, a Nazi 
expert on race who wrote under the name Gerhard Werner, suggested in 
1935 that the population of Lower Styria contained 400,000 Wends and 
182,000 Slovenes. Later scholars subsequently repudiated the Windisch 
race theory as presumptuous. "One cannot objectively talk about any 
so-called 'Wends' ••. for. the Wends never existed as a definite ethnic 
group," Fran Zwitter wrote. Even the Nazis gave up the term Windisch 
4Arnez, Slovenia in European Affairs, p, 87; Barker, The Slovenes 
of Carinthia, pp. 2-3, 41, 173, 275. 
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shortly after their advent to power in Slovenia. 5 
However untenable a differentiation between Wends and Slovenes may 
have been, the Nazis operated throughout their occupation on the assump-
tion that some Slovenes were acceptable in the .Reich and others were 
not. They referred often to "germanizable" (eindeutschungsf~hig) and 
"non-germanizable" (nichteindeutschungsf~hig) Slovenes. The criteria 
for judging the non~germanizable people seems to have degenerated into 
a process of isolating those who guarded their Slovene national con-
sciousness, who didn't "look German", or who exhibited hostility toward 
the German occupation forces. 
Recognizing that undesirable foreign elements were present in 
German-occupied Slovenia to disrupt the germanization process, the Nazis 
moved quickly to plan their removal. Ueberreither chaired a meeting in 
Maribor on May 6, 1941, at which it was decided to deport an estimated 
220,000-260,000 Slovenes, nearly one-third of the total population, to 
Old Serbia. 6 Because transportation and other problems arose, Hitler 
was asked to reconsider his directive against deporting Slovenes to 
. 7 Croatia and to approve sending some Slovene evacuees there. He com-
8 plied with the request. 
As a consequence of these developments, a conference was held in 
" Zagreb on June 4 under the chairmanship of SA-Obergruppenfuhrer 
5Ferenc, "Le Syst~me d'Occupation des Nazis en Slovlnie," pp. 51-
52; Zwitter, "The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy," p. 171. 
6 Memorandum by Benzler, May 6, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
pp. 725-726. 
7Ribbentrop to Hitler, May 16, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
pp. 830-831. 
8Editor's footnote, QQ!!· Series D, Vol. XII, p, 831. 
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Siegfried Kasche, German Minister in Croatia, with Ueberreither in at-
tendance. Agreement was reached to deport a total of 175,000 Slovenes 
in three waves. About 5,000 "politically tainted" persons, principally 
members of the intelligentsia and th~ priesthood, who were acknowledged 
by the Nazis as prime agitators for Slovene nationalism, were to be 
sent to Old Serbia by July 5. Some 25,000 settlers, who had immigrated 
into Upper Carniola and Lower Styria after 1914, were to go to Croatia 
by August 30. Many of these people had come from the Italian littoral. 
Presumably they were more sophisticated in political warfare than was 
convenient for the Nazis. Finally, 145,000 peasants residing by the 
new southernmost frontier of Greater Germany, were to be cleared to 
Croatia by October 31. Although people falling into the third wave 
were not necessarily non-germanizable, the Nazis wanted a totally reli-
able population in this strategic zone. In order to make room for the 
incoming Slovenes within Croatia, a corresponding number of Serbs were 
to be deported from Croatia to Old Serbia. 9 
Kasche drew up a draft for a.German-Croatian treaty on this trans-
fer of population, but Berlin advised him that it was not necessary. 
The resettlement of the Slovenes was regarded as a war measure, for' 
10 
·which speed was of the essence. Property losses of the evacuees con-
sequently would not be taken into consideration. Although the number 
of Slovenes to be deported was revised downward by 45,000-85,000 between 
May 6 and June 4, the Nazis still envisioned a massive action to clear 
9 Report on Conference in Zagreb by Kasche, June 4, 1941. DGFP, 
Series D, Vol. XII, p. 957. 
10 Memorandum from Luther, July 17, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XIII, pp, 157-158. 
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Upper Carniola and Lower Styria of Slavic influence. 
With Slavs removed, Germans would take their place. The importa-
tion of Germans to fill the vacant.Slovene hearths was expedited by the 
fact that Hitler's resettlement program, as introduced in his October 6, 
1939, speech~ was already in motion. For more than a year before the 
Yugoslav invasion, extensive resettlement had been undertaken in the 
ann~xed Polish areas of the East. A wholesale clearing of the non-
German population had been accomplished there, and confiscated property 
was being distributed to people of German blood brought into the Reich 
from the Baltic states, Italy, Russia and the Balkins. Volksdeutschen 
and Reichsdeutschen being prepared for the East were still in sorting 
camps located all over inner Germany. 
By the spring of 1941, many members of former German minority 
groups abroad were available in the Reich for settlement on Slovene 
territory. Among them were: South Tyroleans who had been attached to 
Italy in 1919 (by the German-Italian treaty of October 21, 1939); 
Bessarabians and North Bukovinans (by the Soviet-German treaty of 
September 5, 1940); and South Bukovinans and residents of Northern 
Dobruja (by the Rumanian-German treaty of October 22, 1940). The Nazis 
further anticipated that the Ko~evje Germans would be moved from the 
Italian-held province of Ljubljana into German-occupied Slovenia. 11 
For the massive rearrangement of human material envisioned in the 
transformation of Slovenia, an enormous administrative network was re-
quired. It was standing ready ii;i the Reich Commission for the Consoli-
datipn of the German Folkdom or RKFDV (Reichs Kommissariat f~r die 
1
~emorandum by Benzler, May 6, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
p. 726. 
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Festiguµg deutschen Volkstums). Created by decree on October 7, 1939, 
the day after Hitler's world-electrifying proclamation on resettlement, 
the Commission was entrusted to R~ichsf\1hrer-_SS Heinrich Himmler. 
Himmler was charged with the triple responsibility of organizing the 
return to Germany of Reichsdeutschen and Volksdeutschen from various 
European countries, of eliminating harmful foreign national splinter 
groups within the Reich and of creating new German colonies by resettle-
ment. His RKFDV system came to have unlimited authority in designating 
areas of resettlement and in screening populations to determine who 
might be German, who might be reeducated to Germandom, and who would be. 
relegated to the status of "helots. 1112 · The.future composition of Upper 
Carniola and Lower Styria was completely in the hands of the SS from 
the beginning. 
The organizational lines of the RKFDV gradually emerged as SS 
officers were assigned by Himmler to carry out the provisions of the 
October 7 decreeo On June 11, 1941, the Main Staff Office (Stabshaupt-
amt) was formally constituted in Berlin under the leadership of SS-
Ii Obergruppenfuhrer Ulrich Greifelt. Greifelt became in effect Himmler's 
executive officer for the whole proliferating RKFDV systemo His office 
UI 
on .the Kurfurstendamm was divided into six main departments (Hauptab-
teilung): (I) Planning or Human Allocation (Menscheneinsatz), (II) Ad-
ministration of Resettler Installation, (III) Indemnity Payments, (IV) 
Finances, (V) Central Land Office and (VI) Colonization Activities. 13 
12 Robert L. Koehl, RKFDV, 
Policy, 1939-1945 (Cambridge: 
31-33, 247-249. 
German Resettlement and Population 
Harvard University Press, 1957), pp, 
13 Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, p. 272, 
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Many organizations cooperated with the RKFDV in resettlement work 
with the understanding that Himmler was the final authority on all 
Volkstum questions. Falling from its previous position of superiority, 
VOMI became an outright SS apparatus after 1940 for carrying out orders 
. ,, 14 
of the Re1.chsfuhrer-SS. The Central Immigration Office or EWZ (Ein-
wandererzentralstelle) was a multi-agency processing organization for 
incoming resettlers. Its special train (Sonderzug) for carrying out 
the extensive paper work involved in mass population transfers was in 
effect a transportable office. Other branches of the SS playing prom-
inent roles in the resettlement program, especially on the negative 
side involving deportation of undesirable foreign elements, were the 
Race and Settlement Main Office, or RuSHA (Rasse-und Siedlungshauptamt); 
the Security Service, or SD (Sicherheitdienst); and the Reich Security 
Main Office, or RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). 15 The German Re-
settlement Trustee Company, or DUT (Deutsche Umsiedlu~gs-
Treuhandgesellschaft) was a bank formed by Himmler to provide resettlers 
coming into the Reich with property equivalent to that left behind. 
The RKFDV made itself evident in German-occupied Slovenia immedi-
ately after the Yugoslav invasiono In both Upper Carniola and Lower 
Styria, the.Chief of Civil Administration was designated as a repre-
II 
sentative of the Reichsfuhrer-SS as Reich Commissioner for the Consoli-
dation of German Folkdom. Indeed, there are indications that Himmler 
himself was the author of the deportation plans. Already on April 18, 
he issued orders for the deportation of 260,000 to 280,000 Slovenes, 
14Brown, "The Third Reich's Mobilization of the German Fifth 
Column in Eastern Europe," p. 135. 
15Child, "Political Structure of Hit:j.er's Europe," p. 82, 
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figures approximating those used by Ueberreither on May 6. The expul-
sions were to be carried out in three waves corresponding to those de-
cided upon on June 4o 16 RKFDV branch offices were opened in Bled 
(Veldes) and Maribor to handle affairs in Upper Carniola and Lower 
Styria respectively. The innumerable organizations affiliated with 
RKFDV all operated in Slovenia. 
Immediately prior to initiating the Slovene deportation actions 
however, the Nazis decided to salvage those who were racially acceptable 
for re-germanization (Wiedereindeutschung). Instead of being sent to 
Croatia or Serbia, these people would be sent to VOMI camps within the 
Old Reich or within German boundaries as of 1937 (Altreich) for indoc-
trination and observation. A person was eligible for re-gertllanization 
if any German blood could be detected in him. 17 Himmler outlined the 
procedure to be used on June. 4. Selection of re-germanizable people was 
to be made by representatives of RuSHA. The RKFDV offices in Maribor 
and Bled were charged with responsibility for their induction. All re-
germanizables were to carry along necessary clothes, particularly work 
clothes and shoes, bedding and linenso They would be given 
cards bearing the notation "Citizenship Unclear.(German?)" and stating 
18 that they had been racially examined by RuSHA. Under this order, some 
19 2,500 .Slovenes were sent to·Schelkingen.near Ulm by the end of 1941.-
16Ferenc, "Le Systeme d 'Occupation des Nazis en Slovl'nie," p. 62. 
17child, "Political Structure of Hitler's Europe," p. 87. 
18Anordnung 34/I: "Wiedereindeutschung von Personen.fremder 
NationalitMt aus Stidka'.rnten und Untersteiermark," Reichsfuhrer-SS 
Heinrich Himmler, June 4, 1941, T-81/279/2400646-7. 
19 Ferenc, "Le Systeme d 10ccupation en Slov~nie," p. 64. 
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While the expulsions were commenced during the second half of 1941, 
difficulties cropped up. Between June 6 and July 10, 1941, 6,720 
Slovenes from both Upper Carniola and Lower Styria were sent to Serbia 
20 
and 397 priest.s to. Croatia, in what was presumably the first wave. 
Trouble resulted almost i~mediately in Upper Carniola. Armed uprisings 
organized by the Partisan Liberation Front broke out there at the end 
of July and the.first of August. 'The Nazis must have been aware of the 
popular unrest which the wholesale deportations were causing, because 
already on July 7 Greifelt modified the guidelines for evacuating un-
desirable elements from Upper Carniola upon the advice of Kutscherao 
Racially worthy members of the intelligentsia were to be sent to the 
Altreich for re-germanization. Settlers immigrating into Slovenia after 
1914 needed not to be deported, unless they were active against the 
Germanso If they were not active against the Germans, but inconven-
ienced the germinization process nonetheless, they could be sent into 
the Altreich. Further, Slovenes within twenty kilometers of the Italian 
border could stay in their homes, if they posed no problems for german-
izationo Greifelt emphasized that these modifications did not in any 
way countermand the order to complete a combing out of undesirable 
foreign elements in Upper Carniola. 21 That the evacuation pace slacken-
ed during the second wave can be seen by the fact that only 10,200 
Slovenes, apparently from Lower Styria alone, were sent to Croatia 
20rbid. 
2111Richtlinien f~r die Aussiedlung fremdvolkischer Elemente aus 
11dk1' '' 0 11 4 I I Su arnten, _SS,,-Br1.gadefuhrer Ulrich Greifelt, July 7, 19 1, T-81 279 
2400648, 
22 between July 11 and September 27, 1941. 
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Himmler drastically curtailed the third wave of the evacuation pro-
gram on.August 2. Only Slovenes residing on the frontier zone along 
the banks of the Sava and Sotla (Sattelbach) rivers, plus resident near 
Celje, would be deported, he ordered. About 65,000 rather than. 145,000 
Slovenes now cqmprised the third wave into Croatia: 45,000 from Lower 
23 Styria and 20,000 from Upper Carniola. 
Domestic unrest was not the only factor in hindering the large-
scale ethnic-rearrangement of Slovenia; active resistance in. Croatia 
had reached such proportions that.the government there was unwilling to 
accept any more Slovenes. In.a report of September 22, Kasche expressed 
grave misgivings concerning the resettlement program. "Certainly, the 
resettlement creates unrest among the population in the Reich and in, 
Croatia which in the long run.will give .new impetus an4 new strength to 
the disturbances," he wrote. 24 Although SS-Obergruppenf~hrer Reinhard 
Heydrich, who was in charge of RSHA, urged that the Croatian government 
be forced to accept the 45,000 Slovenes from Lower Styria, his demand 
25 
was never imposed upon Zagreb. Thus, the third wave of deportations 
into Croatia was never even partially implemented. 
Although the resettlement action in the southeast was fraught with 
severe difficulties, the Nazis resolved to carry through the removal of 
22 Ference, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis en Slov,nie," p, 64, 
23Ibid., pp. 64, 80. Unsigned Minutes of Conference in Zagreb, 
September 22, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XIII, p, 552. 
24 Memorandum by Kasche, September 22, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XIII, p. 552. 
25Heydrich to Ribbentrop, September 26, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XIII, pp. 570-571. Telegram from Luther, October 13, 1941. DGFP, 
Series D, Vol~ XIII, p. 571. 
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Germans from the Italian province of Ljubljana into Greater Germany. 
Hitler's decision of August 2 to hait the return of the German minority 
from the southeast until the end of the war did not affect this partic-
ular action. 26 On August 31, an Italian-German treaty was signed for 
the relocation of.Volksdeutschen from the province of Ljubljana. The 
v German.population in the province included 12,400 people in the Kocevje 
district, 1,500 people in Ljubljana and its .environs and about 500 
1 ' h d i ' 27 peop e in ot er scattere commun ties •. 
In the fall, the .Italians permitted the EWZ Sonderzug to enter 
their territory for registration of.these prospective resettlers. 28 Of 
the 11,756 Ko~evje residents recorded as,opting for resettlement within 
. c 
the Reich, 11,113were given a "ST" (Steiermark) classification, indi-
eating that they were to move into the frontier zone of Lower Styria 
where they were to be fully compensated for their property left behind. 
This action was to be completed between October 23 and December 3, 1941. 
Less reliable settlers, who numbered 562, were classified "A" for trans-
port into the Altreich. They were to be given employment and Reich 
bonds for any lost possessions. Only 81 Germans of Ko~evje received 
the. "S" classification for "special .case'' (Sonderfall), which meant· that. 
there were doubts about their loyalt~, race or nationality and that they 
were unacceptable to the Reich. 
26Memorandum by Official of the Department for German Internal 
Affairs, August 7, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XIII, p. 295. 
2711Einteilung des Gebietes Gottschee Ortsbezirke," October 20, 
1941, T-81/306/2433960. 
2811Abs~hlussbericht tber die Erfassung der Deutschenin der 
Gottschee und im Gebiet der Stadt Laibach <lurch die Einwandererzentral~ 
stelle," December, 1941, T-81/306/2433592-680. 
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The EWZ registered a total of 1,280 German resettlers in the 
Ljubljana area and other scattered communities. Of these individuals, 
819 were given a "K" (K!rnten) classification for settlement primarily 
in Upper Carniola. Another 395 were classified "A", while only 41 were 
given the 11 811 rating. 
Since Slovenes could no longer be deported to Croatia, the Nazis 
were faced with the urgent problem of how to make room on the Lower 
.., 
Styrian frontier for the Kocevje immigrants. On October 18, Himmler 
ordered that the Styrians on the Sava-Sotla border be sent to VOMI camps 
in the Altreich for possibl.e re-germanization. He urged that these 
Slovenes be treated well, since th~ majority of them were probably re-
germanizable. v Aware that the Kocevje detachments were soon to arrive, 
29 Himmler urged speed. Although he called them Styrians, many of the 
evacuees were actually Carniolans, for the Sava-Sotla frontier zone was 
largely the ninety-kilometer strip added to Lower Styria from Lower 
Carniola in April, 1941. 
Two days after Himmler's order, placards were placed in the area 
to announce the coming deportations. Slovenes were told that they might 
take along clothes, bedding, money and valuables. If they did not re-
sist the action and if they fulfilled their obligations in their new 
locations, they would be compensated for property left in Slovenia. 30 
I 
Between October 23, 1941, and June, 1942, about 35,000 Slovenes 
29 , , II Anordnung 53/I: "Absiedlung der Untersteiermarker aus dem Save-
Sotla-Streifen," Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, October 18, 1941, 
T-81/279/2400650-2. . 
30
"'Text des Plakates, mit dem die Aussiedlung der Slowenen im 
Ranner Gebiet angekllndigt wurde," October 20, 1941, T-81/306/2434232-3. 
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were transferred into inner Germ.any, where they were never compensated 
31 for their property losses. · Most of these people were from the Lower 
Styrian frontier, since the number of Slovenes cleared from Carinthia, 
after the deportations into Serbia and Croatia ceased, did not reach 
beyond 300 families. Carinthian reports reveal that 947 Slovenes had 
been sent to the Altreich in April, 1942, the month when at least two-
thirds of the deportations occurred, and that the police action clearing 
32 Upper Carniola·was completed within.the following three months. The 
population transfers under Carinthian authorities, in addition to being 
on a much smaller scale than those,in Lower Styria, were also more 
humane, in that families were kept together. 
The difference in the extent of the resettlement program in Lower 
Styria and Upper Carniola can be attributed to the difference in re-
sistance in the two regions. Guerrilla forces in Upper Carniola, al-
ready in operation in the summer of 1941, gained real strength after 
the spring of 1942 and harassed the Nazi occupiers constantly. In Lower 
Styria, the first general resistance materialized only in the spring of 
1943 •. The more effective Nazi rule in Lower Styria can be explained by 
the facts that the Germans coveted the territory.more, that they were 
better organized to intimidate the population there, and that they had 
a more unified and larger German minority upon which to base their 
31 Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis en.Slovlnie," p. 65. 
32Barker, The Slovenes of Carinthia, pp. 230-232. SS-: 
Standartenf~hrer Alois Maier-Kaibitsch to SS-Oberf~hrer Creuz, July 15, 
1942, T-81/279/2400405-6. SS-Gruppenf~hrer ~nd General-leutnant der 




occupation. Patently, the difference in the intensity of the nation-
ality struggle in Lower Styria and Carniola, evident in Habsburg days, 
was still operative in more modern tim~s; 
In view of the popular unrest, the expulsion of the Slovenes for 
purposes.of ethnic.reconstruction terminated .as a viable program during 
the summer of 1942. Several thousand Slovenes were sent into the 
. . 
Altreich .from.that time .until lib~ration, .but these actions were taken 
largely as reprisal measures upon relatives of known partisans or ex~ 
ecuted hostages. The last vestiges of resettlement for germanization 
manifested itself in the pathetic.collection of.racially acceptable 
children of partisans. Those under three years of age, numbering be-
tween 600 and 900, were taken into inner Germany for ~doption into 
German, families •. 34 In addition, the return of some 6,000 Croatians in 
Slovenia to Croatia w~s negotiated.in 1943. 35 Whether this agreement 
was.carried into effect is questionable. But there was no more talk of 
dumping significant sectors.of the Slovene population outside the 
Slovene homeland to make room·for incoming Germans. 
Considerable confusion exists concerning the total numbe~ of 
Slovenes forced from their homes by the.Nazis. Many fled on.their 
own into.the province of Ljubljana and Croatia to escape the harsh Na.zi 
rule. In September, 1941, German.officials estimated that.about 17,000 
Slovenes had entered Croatia voluntarily, but admitted that such figures 
33Ferenc, "Le Syst~e d'Occupation .des Nazis·en Slovenie," pp. 76-
77, 79-80, 89. 
34Ibid., p. 106. Koehl, RKFDV, German Resettlement and Population 
Policy, 1939-1945, p. 220. 




could not be determined with anything approaching accuracy. Without 
doubt, unregulated evacuat:f,on from Slovenia clouded even further uncon-
firmed reports on ac-i.ual deportations·. from the troubled land. Many. 
discrepancies among reported figures exist, sqme of which rea.ch as high 
37 
as 160,000. Most figures cited for this study come from the.official, 
Yugoslav report on_the Nazi occupation in Slovenia by Ferenc, and his 
assertion that 35,000 Slovenes were transported to the Altreich between 
October 23, 1941, and June, 1942, .is corroborated in the captured Nazi. 
docuinents. A report on resettlers from Lower Styria as·of June 12, 
38 1942, showed the reception of 30,839 Slovenes in resettlement camps. 
36unsigned Minu.tes of Conference, in Zagreb, September 22, 1941. 
~' Series D, Vol. XIII, p. 553. 
37wolff, The Balkans in-Our Time, p, 204, claims that 60,000 women 
and children were put on freight cars and dumped in Serbia. A, .E. 
Moodie, "Italo-Yugoslav Boundary," Geographical Journal, Vol. CI (1943), 
p. 54, reports that over 160,000 Slovenes were deported to Germany and 
former Poland. Eugene Michel Kulischer, Displacement of Population in 
Europe (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943), p. 79, says that 
56,000 Slovenes were sent to Croatia and Serbia. Bernard Newman, 'The 
New Europe (New York: MacMillan, 1943), p, 323, claims that 150,0~ 
Slovenes we~e deported to Serbia. Schechtman, European Population 
Transfers, 1939-1945; p. 244, writes that 120,000 Slovenes were deported 
or fled to Serbia, Germany or Italian Slovenia. Lilian F. Gray, "The 
Martydom of· the Slovenes," Contemporary Review, Vol. CLXIII (1943) pp. 
110-111, gives a confirmed report that 85,000 Slovenes had been deported 
into Germany and a.Red Cross.report that 31,000 people were sent to 
Serbia. Louis Adamic, Inside ,Yugoslavia (Ridgefield, Conn.: Acorn, 
1942), p. 4, claims 100;000 Slovenes were shipped to Serbia and Croatia. 
Arnez, Slovenia in European Affairs, pp. 88-91, acknowledges that the 
statistical reports conflict. 
3811 umsiedler: aus der Untersteiermark in Lagern," Scherzer, June 12, 
1942, T-81/270/2390029. The Slovenes were sent to various parts of 
Germany as follows: 
Baden - 4,540 Lower Silesia - 7,869 
Bavarian Ostmark - 769 Saxony - 5,678 
Brandenburg - 1;799 Thuringen - 2,830 
Franconia - 1,015 Wuerttemberg - 6,339 
Total: 30,839 
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In sum.total, then, the Germans. cleared systematically about 55,000 
Slovenes from their area of occupation.· 
German migration into cleared homesteads followed hard on the 
heels of the deportations. Although the early Nazi plan for the trans-
plantation of 145,000 Slovenes with strong German elements along the 
frontier went awry, the RKFDV in Lower Styria worked diligently to 
create· a model border. settlement .. zone along the . Sava-Sot la strip. It 
came to be called by the Nazi bureaucracy."Settlement Area A." (See 
Map V.) Between November, 1941 11 and July, 1942, nearly 13,000 Ko~evje 
set'(:lers were moved into the region in twenty-five detachments which 
were designated with typical Nazi bombast as sd~rme to denote· their 
39 quasi-military role as vanguards .of.the German race. These vanguards 
had been created l;>y local chiefs of.the Ko~evje Kulturbund, after the 
organization had been dominated by the .Nazis in 1938. The vanguards 
were divided on a geographical basis; and each was subdivided into var-
ious groupings for men, women and children. For example, a political 
organization, called the Mannschaft or team, was formed in each van-
40 guard for men from 21 to 50 years of age. 
The Naxis attempted to simulate con4itions of their former.home-
land for the incoming settlers along the Sava-Sotla border. Since the, 
Ko~evje Germans were spared a waiting period in resettlement camps, 
their first assignments,were temporary. Necessary adjustments would be 
forthcoming later. The 1003 immigrants from the industrial sector.of 
39Ferenc, "Le Syst~me d'Occupation enSlovlnie,11 p. 66. "Erl:uter-
ungen zum Besiedlungsplan des Siedungsgebietes A in der Untersteier-
mark," _SS:--Sturmbannf&hrer Laforce, May 10, 1942, T-81/284/2406856-944. 
4011EWZ Abschlussbericht," T-81/306/2433592....:680. 
v//1 Settlement . Area. 


























the town of Ko'tevje (Sturm I) were accordingly sent to Bre~ice (Rann), 
Krrko (Gurkfeld), Radere (Ratschach) ~nd Sevnica (Lichtenwald) to be. 
tradesmen,. Since the rest of tl:>.e Ko~evj e repa trifl. tes were peas an ts, 
41 they were given agricultural property all over Settlement Area A. 
Three former Slovene homesteads were combined to make one new German 
. 42 
farm inaneffort·to correct uneconomical fragmentation of the land. 
Amortg the new residents were.established small enclaves of ethnic 
Germans.from Soutl:>. Bukovina,. Bessarabia, the Dobruja and South Tyrol. 
TheBessarapian Volksdeutsch~n, made up of wine growing families from 
a region by· the Black· Sea., were settled near Bizelj sko (Wisell). Num-
bering 507 people, they were dee~ed suitable as protectors of a border 
zone,because of long experience against a French majority in their 
former home~ Unfortunately, their heavy accents made· their' German in- . 
comprehensible :i.n Lower Styria. The Volksdeutschen from the Dobruja, 
comprising 410 meml:>ers .of wine growing families; were given land near. 
v Buce (Fautsch). About·SO South Tyrolean families, experienced as fruit 
and wine growers, were settled near Sevnica. Finally, a few expert 
hand workers from South Bukovina were also included in the ,new German 
43 
community. All told, over a th9usand additional ethnic Germans joined 
h K V ' ' 1 A A t e ocevJe group in Sett ement rea • 
The Nazis were quite solicitous of the.Volksdeutsch settlers in 
many ways. Women:welfare workers met Ko~evje immigrants as they arrived 
via train in the~r new location.· One such woman, stationed in Kr~ko in 
4111Besiedlungsplan des Siedlungsgebietes A," T-81/284/2406856-944. 
42 Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, p. 244. 
4311Besiedlungsp1an des Siedlungsgebietes A," T-81/284/2406856-944. 
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the winter of 1941-42, reported that some ?f the resettlers she escorted 
to their homesteads, which she called winter quarters, were appalled at 
how bleak and spartan they were. They were cheered, however, with a 
k . d d d d 'd d k h b f h' 44 in war an eci e to ma et e est o tings. Another welfare 
worker visited the Bessarabians in the same period and found them dis-
tl d b t th . t. 45 grun e. a ou eir property compensa ions. 
The RKFDV Main Staff Office in Berlin tried to protect the German 
residents of the.Sava-Sotla strip from unpleasant contacts with former 
owners of the property they now occupied. A rule was issued that mem-
bers of the uprooted Styrian border population were absolutely forbidden 
46 to return to the area. Further, special courses in maternal and child 
v 47 
care were provided for the Kocevje women, The health and happiness 
of the German vanguards on the border was of utmost concern to Hitler's 
lieutenants. 
With ludicrous detail, Nazi bureaucrats occupied themselves with 
projecting elaborate schemes for the absorption of the Volksdeutsch pop-
ulation. SS-Sturmbannfllhrer Laforce, who was associated with the RKFDV 
system in Lower Styria, submitted a plan for the reorganization of 
4411Bericht tber die Betreuungsarbeit bei der Umsiedlung der 
Gottscheer Volksgruppe," Ansiedlerbetreuerin Martha Weizenh\:'ifer, no 
date, T-81/284/2406851~2. 
4511T" · k · b · h 11 b d h dl " dl atig eits eric tu er ie Gottsc eer Umsie ung, Ansie er-
betreuerin Emilie Tribusch, no date, T~Sl/284/2406853-4. 
46nr. Stier to Pg. See, February 3, 1942, T-81/279/2400529-31. 
Dr. Stier to Gauleiter Uiberreithe~, June 1, 1942, T-81/279/2400544-
6. 
4711Titigkeitsbericht;e llber die Mtltterschulungsarbeit van Ende Juli 
bis Ende September 1942 im Ansiedlungsgebiet der Untersteiermark," 
Schwester Marga Sessner, September 20, 1942, T-81/284/2406841-2. 
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Settlement Area A in May, 1942. 48 Analyzing the Kocevje settlers van-
guard by vanguard, with many maps and charts, Laforce tried to perfect 
the simulation of conditions in their new homes to those they had left 
behind. For the peasant population, he too~ intq consideration such 
factors as general landscape features, fertility of the soil; crops 
raised, home industrial skills, location of neighboring communities and 
transportation facilit~es to towns or cities. For the small urban 
group, he corretated vocational ability with job opportunities in the 
Reich •. 
On the basis of his study, Laforce recommended that 60% of the 
Ko~evje settlers stay where,they.were and that the remainder be trans-
ferred to new locations more comparable to their previous homes. Ad-
mitting that.Sturm II, which had formerly possessed rich land, simply 
could not be given comparable soil in .Settlement Area A, he nonetheless 
decided that they should remain in the quarters initially assigned to. 
them. Laforce suggested that Sturm XVIII be broken up and its members 
scattered all over the sett.lement area, because there had been too much 
inbreeding in the group in the past. When the reorganization of the 
Sava-Sotla strip would be complete, the Ko~evje settlers would have 47% 
of their old neighbors. From March, 1942, to November., 1943, twenty-
one meetings of the RKFDV settlement office in Maribor were held, usual-
ly under the chairmanship of Ueberreither, to carry into effect many of 
Laforce's.recommendations. 49 The case of Settlement Area A is interest~ 
. . 
ing in.illuminating the Nazi "scientific" approach to population 
4811Besiedlungsplan des Siedlungsgebietes A," T-81/284/2406856-944. 
4911. , II Berichte I-XX! uber die Sitzung des Ansiedlungsstabes," March 
19, 1942-November 17, 1943, T-81/285/2407726-882. 
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manipulation. 
Since.the evacuatio11, operation in Upper Carniola was so small, the 
RKDFV officers in Bled were hampered in carrying out a resettlement 
program. They felt.frustrated they had been allotted such a small scope. 
for action.· One wrote a strongly worded memorandum to the effect that 
the germanization of Upper Carniola could not be accomplished in terms 
of importing a hundred German families but in.terms of a.thousand such 
families. He recognized tha1;: much blood·would be shed in the process, 
but deemed that one·should get on with the task regardless. Proposing 
that 500 families should be.settled in Upper Carniola by.the end of 
1942; he counseled .that.the tempo .of resettlement be quickened in the 
50 
next year. 
Recognizing that ethnic Germans immigrating into former Yugoslav 
territory in South Carinthia would be put under great strain, RKFDV 
officers carefully scrutin:i,zed populations to find appropriate material 
for the area. The Bled office reported .to Ra.iner in July, 1942, that 
the following settlers were available: about 5,000 Volksdeutschen from 
Bukovina; 20,000 Bosnian Germans whc;, were not.at all reliable politi-
cally; between 10,000-20,000 settle~s from Lorraine, of whom only a few 
would be suitable; about 1,000 Ko~evje Germans, for whom there was no· 
room in Lower Styria; and 670 South Tyroleans. Berlin acknowledged that 
these groups would not provide enough political leadership for Upper 
Carniola and that the ideal solution would be the importation of 
5011 ti , II II O d Grundsatzliche G~danken. und Vorschlage fur die Durchfuhrung der 
Aufgabe·des RKF;I' D:i,pl. ~· Nimpfer, August!, 1942, T-81/279/2400519-
22. 
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51 trustworthy Germans from Carinthia proper. After perusing the list 
of prospective settlers, Rainer approved the Bukovinans, Kotevje Germans 
and South Tyroleans, expressed skepticism about the Bosnians; and show-
52 
ed interest only in industrial workers from Lorraine. 
The RKFDV bureaucrats in Carinthia, as their counterparts in Lower 
Styria, engaged in methodological population planning. During the 
sununer of 1942, they were preparing a master plan to reorganize the 
"folk politics" (Volkspolitik). of Upper Carniola, so that the land would 
become German again in the best way possible. Rural and industrial 
areas were being identified as key points of accelerated germanizatton~3 
Many stat:i,.stical st_udies on the order of that by Laforce were under-,-
taken. For example, an attempt was made to indicate where South Buko-
vinan Volksdeutschen should be placed so that their new surroundings 
would be similar to those in their homeland. 54 
All told, very few ethnic Germans were established on Slovene soil 
attached to Carinthia. In June, 1942, 592 Volksdeutschen from the prov-
ince of Ljubljana were reported in both Carinthia and Upper Carniola. 
The rest of the 1,280 Germans registered by the EWZ were scattered in 
Styria and other parts of the Reich. 55 Upon arrival in Upper Carniola, 
many of the Ljubljana inunigrants were located in "resettler homes'' such 
51Dr. Friedl to Gauleiter Rainer, July 20, 1941, T-81/279/2400534-
5. 
52D r. Friedl to Dr. Stier, July 23, 1942, T-81/279/2400536-7. 
53 11 • • SS-Gruppenfuhrer und General-leutnant der Pol1ze1 to SS-
Gruppenfuhrer.UlriGh Greililt, August 7, 1942~-81/279/2400538. 
54 ., 
"Erklarungen_zu den Ortsbereichen der slldbuchenlander," Dr. 
Kurbisch, August 20, 1942, T-81/279/2400476-7. 
55
·-·u"b · htl · h B · h 11 b d · u · · dl d · ersic 1c er eric tu er 1e msie ung aus er Provinz 
Laibach," June 30, 1942, T-81/306/2433892-3. 
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as resort.hotels, where they were very.uneasy. In addition, 412 
South Tyrolean artisans were reported.settled in "liberated" Slovene 
homestea4s in Upp~r Carniola. 57 
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The germanization of Slovenia took courses other than that of .re-
settlement.· Slovenes had to be convinced that they were members of the 
great German national community. Indeed, the Nazis told the Lower 
58 Styrians·that they were not Slovenes at all, but "Styrian patriots." 
Efforts to erase Slavic.conseiousness in the population included meas~ 
ures to prohibit use of the Slovene language and to impose German, the 
control of .the educational system, and.the establishment of local organ-
izations to assimilate natives into the Reich. 
The German linguistic offensive took many forms, German was de-
clared the only official language after the occupation began. Despite 
this decree, the use of Slovene in the mass was not immediately prohib-
ited for "psychological reasons." Signs were changed from Slovene to 
German, names and surnames rendered in.their German forms, and about 
two million Slovene books confiscated. Slovenes were forced to take 
short courses in the German language. Between 1941 and 1943, over 
300,000 people were registered in such courses in Lower Styria, and 
some_ 90,000 in Upper Carniola. 59 Despite all these efforts, the 
Slovenes still spoke their own tongue·. in both provinces. 
5611Lage in.den Oberkrainer Umsiedlerheimen der Laibacher Umsiedler;' 
April 8, 1942, T-81/279/2400281-2. 
57 Schechtmann, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, p. 64. 
58Rafal Lemkin, Axis Rule in.Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 1944), p. 245. 
59 11 ' Ferenc, Le Systeme d'Occupation .des Nazis en Slov~nie," pp. 
66-67, 76, 94-95, 97 •. 
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The Slovene educational system was placed completely under German 
direction. After the invasion, 1,235 German elementary teachers arrived 
in Lower Styria and 260 in Upper Carniola to organize German schools. 
The principal subjects taught to Slovene pupils were the German lan-
guage, the biography of Hitler, singing, and physical education. Org-
anizations were closely connected with these schools to indoctrinate 
60 
with Nazi ideas the youth of both sexes between the ages of 14 and 20. 
Because the Slovene intelligentsia was so nationalistic and dangerous 
to German aims, the Nazis restricted higher education for Slovenes 
severely. University students from Upper Carniola, for instance, were 
permitted to study only in the Reich and only with clearance through the 
RKFDV. They were clos~ly checked for the~r political views and their 
d . . 61 · progress towar germanization. 
Two separate organizations were established in May, 1941, in Lower 
Styria and Upper Carniola for the adult populace of Slovenia acceptable 
to the Germans. The Styrian Homeland Union (Steierische Heimatbund) 
,, 
was led by SA-Oberfuhrer Franz.Steindl. All 10,818 members of the 
Kulturbund in Lower Styria were inducted into the new group, and com-
mand posts went to former Kulturbund members. Dissention arose among 
the Nazi chiefs about the composition of the Carinthian Folk Union 
(K~rntner Volksbund). With the.agreement of Rainer, it was formally 
subordinated to the NSDAP in December. A local militia (Wehrmannshaft) 
' d ' h b h ' ' 62 was associate wit ot organizations. 
60Ibid., pp, 74-76. 
6111Hochschulstudium der Oberkrainer," September 23, 1942, T-81/279/ 
2400548-52. 
62Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis en Slov~nie," pp. 67-
6 9 , 7 3-7 4, 77. 
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Belonging to the Heimatbund or Volksbund was considered a prereq-
uisite for German citizenship. Definitive members were automatically 
granted full citizenship (deutsche Staatsangehorigkeit), while temporary 
members were given a qualified citizenship status (deutsche Staatsange-
hbrigkeit auf Widerruf). The distinction .between these two categories 
was based on the degree of German,nationality exhibited by various mem-
bers. With the. bestowal of some form of citizenship, Slovenes were 
liable to serve in.the German Army.· Military conscription was intro-
63 duced in Lower Styria in March, 1942, and in Upper Carniola in July. 
Following the pattern noted earlier, the Nazis were more successful 
in Lower Styria than in Upper Carniola regarding these organizations. 
In order to pacify his territory in the fall of 1942, Rainer decided to 
grant temporary membership in the Volksbund to the widest possible ex-
tent. He urged that a last political examination be made of the popu-
lace in Upper Carniola to insure the reception of only reliable ele-
ments into its ranks. 64 Membership in.the Volksbund reaGhed ~7% of 
those eligible, actually two percent more than that in the Heimatbund. 
Such statistics are deceptive, however, because many Slovenes were 
motivated to join the organization solely out of fear. The effective-
ness of their military affiliates forms a sounder base for comparison 
between the Volksbund and the.Heimatbund. The Wehrmannshaft in Upper 
Carniola had disintegrated by,early 1942, while the same group in Lower 
Styria was operative and formidable until the spring of 1944. 65 
63Ibid .• , 72 84 pp. ' • 
6411Richtlinien ffl.r die Ausfolgung der vorlaufigen Mitgliedskarten," 
Gauleiter Rainer, S:e,ptember 21, 1942, T-Si/279/2400511-2. 
65 Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis en Slovenie," pp. 69, 
90, 93. 
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Since the Nazis had been unable to carry through their plans to. 
deport large numbers of undesirable Slovenes, they had to absorb many 
within their system of occupation. All those people who were not ac-
ceptable to the.Heimatbund or Volksbund were designated as wards of the 
German Reich (Schtitzangehorige des Deutschen Reiches). With complete 
control over their lives, the government placed them in hard labor. The 
80,000 wards in Lower Styria presented such enormous problems that the 
Nazi authorities at one point considered their sterilization. Work 
camps, not unlike conce~trat;ion camps in many respects, were opened all 
over the province.to accommodate them. The wards were less troublesome 
in Upper Carniola only because the Nazi overlords in this region were 
never able to distinguish them from citizens with temporary title. 66 
In addition to the germanizatio'l} program within Slovenia, a re-
germanization effort was instituted in VOMI camps in the Altreich for 
Slovene inmates. As the Slovenes were first brought into the camps in 
late 1941, an order was issued by the Propaganda Office in Berlin to 
treat them like Volksdeutschen~ 67 However, a differentiation was grad-
ually made between re-germanizable and non-germanizable Slovenes. Mero-
bers of the.former group carried the "A" classification on their cards 
and were able to live outside the camps under supervision of the police. 
Non-germanizable Slovenes, who.were classed as foreigners, had to live 
in the camps, .although-they were issued passes.for work outside. 68 The 
66Ibid.~ pp •. 72-73. 
67Pomplun to Reichspropagandaamt Bayerische Ostmark, November 22, 
1941, T-81/270/2389996.. . 
., 
6811Arbeitseinsatz von Slowenen," October 23, 1941, SS-Standarten-
fuhrer Creuz, T-81/279/2400708-9. 
Slovenes were judged the most difficult of all the inmates in VOMI 
camps. Some were hanged for running ~way. ·Of the 35 ,000 taken into 
69 the Altreich only 16,000 were finally judged re-germanizable. 
The resettlements carried out in 1941 and 1942, upon which the 
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germanization of Slovenia was primarily founded, developed on a day-to-
day, emergency basis. Although the Nazis put a "scientific" veneer on 
this endeavor, they were unable to proceed on rational lines. Beginning 
with the assumption that one-third of the Slovene population was un-
worthy for inclusion in.their Lebensraum, they eventually granted some 
form of German citizenship to much of this group. Further, they ac-
cepted as possible Germans the very people originally scheduled for 
deportation outside the Reich. Almost overnight, Slovenes seemed to 
be elevated from Slavic .rejects into Volksdeutschen. With an unstable 
and truncated resettlement program, other facets of germanization in 
Slovenia could hardly make much o{ an imprint. 
69 Koehl, RKFDV, German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-
1945, p. 219. 
CHAPTER V 
. . . 
AJ?OSTSCRIPT ON .THE NAZ:i: PLAN FOR SLOVENIA 
On August 12, 1942, Gauleit:er Ueberrei1:her_made.a public announce-
ment th~t the resettlement: activities in the border·zone of Lower 
1 Sty:i;:ia, .as ·ordered in O~tober, 1941, were ended. This date can be. 
take-o, as a,terminat:f_on of the,entire resettlement program for Slovenia, 
because. the Sava-Sotla strip was the .major _site of the program in the· 
first place,and nq others were developed. Quite prematurely, the Nazis 
had to close. out the most· crti,cial aspect of the. conversion of Slovenia 
into an impregnable frontie~ zone for the Ger~an race. After fifteen 
months of German,rule, it wa,s clear that Slovenia would·not become the 
outpost of the Third Reich that-Nazi planners had envisioned. 
Wit;:hout the,introduction .of-large numbers of reliable.Germans, the 
germanization effort·depended-la:i;:gely upor,. the temper of· the Slovene 
populace. Neither-in.Upper Carniola, .nor in Lower Styria were the Nazis 
sat:f_sfied with the. fruits of the:i,r labors. On the occasion of the first 
anniversary of the,Nazi-occupation-of'.Upper Carniola, Gauleiter Rainer 
reported that Slovenes still .insulted,Reich Germans there. Steindl, 
speaki-o,g at about the.same time .as head of the Styrian Heimatbund, in-
dicated. that the political enthusiasm of the people of Lower Styria had 
111Kundmachur,.g tber-die Beendigung der Um-und-Aussiedlung in,der 
Untersteiermark,." Stajerski Gospodar, August 15, 1942, T-81/306/2434211. 
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d 1 . d . 'f' . 1 2 ec 1.ne . s1.gn1. 1.cant y. More revealing than individual commentaries 
76 
is the fact that neither Upper Carniola nor Lower Styria had yet been 
incorporated into the Reich. Orders to incorporate on October 1, then 
on November 1, 1941, were cancelled "for technical reasons of legisla-
tion," which was probably an euphemistic reference to the disturbances 
3 then current among the Slovenes. Further, the. incorporations never 
materialized. Officials in.Bled and Maribor were fully aware early in 
the occupation that the major part of the Slovene population had been 
thoroughly alienated against German rule. 
Another assessment of the initial germanization effort in Upper 
Carniola and Lower Styria may be garnered by an evaluation of the Nazi 
rule in the province of Ljubljana which was instituted late in 1943. 
The Nazis never attempted to change the ethnic composition of the pop-
ulation there. Perhaps this approach was mainly determined by the 
strong anti-German sentiment in the region and the unfavorable course 
of the war. Nonetheless, the overtones of the failures in Upper 
Carniola and Lower Styria must have had some bearing on the nature of 
this later occupation. 
In September, 1943, after the fall of Mussolini made it militarily 
necessary, the Nazis took over the province of Ljubljana and included 
the area in the Adriatic .Littoral Zone of Operations (Operationszone 
Adriatische Kustenland), along with Trieste, Istria and a portion of 
Venetia. Rainer, who received .command of the zone as Supreme Commis-
sioner (Oberster Kommissar), was charged with the important task of 
2 Ferenc, "Le Syst~me d'Occupation des Nazis en Slov~nie," pp. 107-
108. 
3rbid.~ pp. 81-83. 
77 
4 keeping the enemy out and preventing a political vacuum to develop. 
Within the Adriatic Li'ttoral Zone of Operation, former Yugoslav 
territory had been the scene .of extensive anti-fascist resistance be-
tween 1941 and 1943. Under Italian administration, the province of 
Ljubljana had been governed in a relatively mild manner. 5 Consequently, 
harrassment by .Partisan. forces had become so audacious that the Par ti-
sans even succeeded.in assassinating Natla~en for his alleged collabo-
ration with the enemy. 6 When the Germans took over, they found the 
Partisans in control of most of the region around Ljubljana. 
Naming General Leo Rupnik, former mayor of Ljubljana, as head of 
the province, Rainer then proceeded to consolidate German strength in 
the area. Anti-communist Slovenes were enlisted in a Home Guard 
(Domobranci) under covert Nazi supervision to fight the Partisans. 
While exploiting the political divisions of the Slovenes in the prov-
ince, the Germans never attempted to extirpate their Slavic conscious-
ness. Slovenes were appointed to administrative positions, and the Nazis 
even entertained suggestions not only to reunify the territory of Carni-
ola, but to enclose eventually all.Slovenes in a Slovene province (Gau 
Slowenien) within the Reich. 7 The issue so crucial in Nazi-occupied 
Slovenia as of 1941-1942--whether a Slovene was germanizable or non-
germanizable or re-germanizable--had no relevance in the enlarged Nazi-
occupied Slovenia as of ·1943-1945. Now it mattered only whether a 
4child, "Political Structure of Hitler's Europe," p. 96. 
5Arnez, Slovenia in European Affairs, p. 110. 
6Elisabeth Wiskemann, "Partitioned Yugoslavia," in Survey of Inter-
national Affairs, 1..212-~:. Hitler's Europe, p. 670 o 
7 . ,,. 
Ferenc, "Le Systeme d'Occupation des Nazis en Slovenie," ppo 112, 
117. 
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Slovene was communist or anti-communist. 
In assessing the reasons for Nazi failures in Slovene policies, a 
number of features are quite clear. In the first place, Berlin did not 
distinguish adequately among the nationalistic sentiments of the 
Slovene people as found in various regions. As the census of 1910 and 
the inventory of 1941 showed so clearly, German influence was unevenly 
distributed within their Slovene acquisitions. Why the Nazis expected 
to drag Upper Carniola with its strong Slavic orientation into the 
Lebensraum is difficult to understand. Significantly, they pretended 
that its residents were not Carniolans at all, but South Carinthians or 
Styrians. This irrational aspect of the Nazi approach to Slovenia was 
marked by the substantive difference between Nazi successes in Lower 
Styria and Upper Carniola. 
The Nazis had required of the Slovenes far more than a mere acqui-
escence to foreign rule. Had they imposed only language decrees, 
school teachers, and organizations upon their subjects, their rule 
could have been accepted as conventional enough in the Eastern European 
experience. Indeed, the treatment of the Kotevje Germans by Slovene 
authorities in the interwar period had given ample material to the Nazi 
propaganda machine. But the heartless uprooting of thousands of inno-
cents had never before been carried to such lengths. The question of 
whether Slovenia could be reconstructed or not extended beyond the 
realms of passivity or hostility to German rule. It had become one of 
general human compassion. 
Harsh and irrational as the German occupation of Slovenia may have 
been, it was also undertaken under a military regime during a fierce 
world-wide war. In Lower Styria, where the Nazis had their greatest 
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strength among the Slovenes, German data on reprisals during the occupa-
tion is sobering: 14,216 civilians shot; 27,208 people tortured; 
8 27,408 people arrested; and 21,069 people interned. If a population's 
loyalty to the German ideal was wayering at best, sucl). acts would hardly 
serve to bring its members into the fold. 
In .the la~t analysis, Slovene national cqnscience proved stronger 
than the Nazis supposed, but.for reasons beyond provincial differences 
and humanitarian co.nsiderations ~ During their thousand years under 
German rule, the Slovenes may have.been indifferent Slavs, but they_ 
never became Germans. Further, in spite of all the German,fifth column 
activities, the disaffection .of Slovenes within the borders of Yugoslav-
ia, the vacillations of the . Slovene le.aders' approach toward Hitler, 
there was nothing in .the .recent pas.t: · to .indicate. that the Slovenes 
would desert their Slavic heri_tage. Th~y might possibly have accepted 
German rule as Slovenes, as they once did under the Habsburgs, but not: 
as Germans. liitler's dream of-Sloven:i,a as.an outpost of the Third 
Reich must finally be judged as a colossal misreading of history. 
811 Information on the People's Liberation War in Yugoslavia," in 
Les Syst~mes·d'Occupation en Yougoslavie, 1941-1945, pp. 31-32. 
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